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 Though some study into the relationship between Cicero and Caesar has occurred, it is 
relatively little and the subject warrants more consideration.  This is a significant gap in the 
historiography of late republican history.  This thesis examines and attempts to define their 
relationship as a public amicitia.  By looking at the letters of Cicero, his three Caesarian 
speeches, and  his philosophical dialogue de Amicitia, I show that the amicitia between these two 
men was formed and maintained as a working relationship for their own political benefit, as each 
had something to gain from the other.       
 Cicero’s extant letters encompass a little more than the last twenty years of Cicero’s life, 
when some of the most important events in Roman history were occurring.  In this thesis, I 
examine selected letters from three collections, ad Quintum fratrem, ad Familiares, and ad 
Atticum for clues relating to Caesar’s amicitia with Cicero.  These letters reveal the tumultuous 
path that the amicitia between Cicero and Caesar took over the years of the mid-50s until 
Caesar’s death, and , surprisingly, show Cicero’s inability to choose a side during the Civil War 
and feel confident in that choice.  After Caesar’s victory at Pharsalus in 48, the letters reveal that 
Cicero hoped that Caesar could or would restore the republic, and that as time passed, he became 
less optimistic about Caesar and his government, but still maintained the public face of amicitia 
with Caesar.   
  
 Cicero’s three Caesarian speeches,  pro Marcello, pro Ligario, and pro Rege Deiotaro, 
which he gave with Caesar in attendance,  reveal that Cicero’s hope for Caesar peaked in pro 
Marcello and that Cicero and Caesar were working together for pro Ligario.   By the time that 
pro Rege was given however, Cicero was far more disenchanted with Caesar and his 
government, and his speech is more forced than his previous ones, which read as more sincere.  
The tenor of these orations fit with those of Cicero’s letters; a similar pattern in Cicero’s attitude 
towards Caesar can be seen in both the letters and speeches.   
  The final source that is examined in this thesis is Cicero’s de Amicitia, which is a piece 
of his philosophica that examines amicitia (friendship) in the Roman world.  This is the only text 
written after Caesar’s death that is examined in this thesis, and I believe that if it is read with an 
eye towards the amicitia between Caesar and Cicero, this treatise, which devalues ordinary 
political amicitia, gives the reader clues about the problems caused by political amicitia.  While 
the majority of this  treatise deals with a more warm kind of amicitia, I do not believe that this is 
what Cicero had with Caesar. They had  neither a friendship nor an alliance but a forced cordial 
relationship that dipped into elements of friendship and alliance whenever strategically possible.  
Because of the necessity of their maintaining good relations, they formed this peculiar but 
extremely important variety of amicitia. Based on the evidence in this thesis, there was some 
kind of public amicitia between the two men, even after Caesar crossed the Rubicon, and 
especially after the Caesarian victory at Pharsalus in August of 48; that amicitia lasted down 
almost to the death of Caesar on March 15, 44.     
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Introduction 
 
In 63 BC, the people of Rome elected a novus homo (new man) consul in his first year of 
eligibility.  With his election, he had gained the most important and powerful political position in 
Rome.  The Romans were fortunate that they elected such an intelligent and capable man this 
year, as the republic would be threatened by a coup.  Ultimately, the revolt was crushed because 
of the consul’s leadership, influence, and speaking ability.  The survivors of the conspiracy were 
dangerous men, and the consul put to the senate the question of how they should be punished.  
According to Sallust, the consul pushed for the execution of these conspirators.  The senate was 
unanimous in their agreement until one patrician rose to speak.  This patrician had worked his 
way up the cursus honorum as well, and was further given the honor of being Pontifex Maximus, 
and was well loved by the masses.  The patrician pleaded to the other senators for leniency and 
clemency for the conspirators, as it was not the Roman way to execute citizens without trials.  
The consul was understandably annoyed, and became more so as senators joined with the 
patrician until another respected senator spoke last and swayed the body to move for execution.  
As far as historians know, this was the first public but indirect conflict between the consul 
Marcus Tullius Cicero and the patrician Gaius Julius Caesar.  Cicero won the day, but he also 
saw the potential power that Caesar could harness.   
 Historians have all but exhausted the study of Cicero and Catiline, and his feud with 
Publius Claudius (Clodius) Pulcher is also well known.  Furthermore, Beryl Rawson has detailed 
Cicero’s relationship with Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus, but no one to this point has examined the 
amicitia between Cicero and Caesar in any significant depth.  The purpose of this thesis is to 
begin to fill this historiographical gap by examining the attitudes of Cicero towards Caesar from 
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Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon to Caesar’s assassination.  Scholars have (accurately) painted 
Cicero as a supporter of the republic and thus have agreed that the actions of Caesar disgusted 
Cicero.1  Yet they have ignored the nature of the relationship that Caesar and Cicero established 
while the former was in Gaul, and overly simplified the social dynamic between the two men.  I 
do not question that Cicero was unhappy with the tyranny that Caesar attempted to maintain.  
There can be no doubt about this.  My purpose with this thesis is to investigate and attempt to 
discern the more subtle aspects of Cicero’s attitudes towards Caesar to determine whether Cicero 
was able at times to overlook their political differences and remember Caesar as a man with 
whom he shared a working political relationship (amicitia); to say “friendship” in a personal 
sense would be to step too far.  Cicero was certainly happy that the tyrant of Rome was dead, but 
I demonstrate that  he also remembered that a former colleague had been assassinated as well.  A 
study such as this can tell us more about Cicero, but it also has the potential to reveal more about 
Roman political culture as well.  Though I will not dwell on this point, and for the most part 
leave any indications one way or another for future research, further study should be done to 
discover what role politics played in establishing and maintaining amicitia in Rome.  
 The late republic was a turbulent time and events can easily become jumbled and 
confused.  Because of this potential for confusion, I will attempt to set out a brief and clear 
timeline for the reader that will encompass the events mentioned in this paper; in no way is it 
exhaustive, nor is it meant to be.  In order to obtain his consulship in 59, Caesar bribed many 
men and spent excessively, so that by the time his consulship was over, he was heavily in debt.  
                                                 
1
 I do not read German at present and am unable to consult  the following works: Matthias Gelzer,Cicero und 
Caesar (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1968); Friedrich Lossmann, Cicero und Caesar im Jahre 54; Studien zur Theorie 
und Praxis der romischen Freundschaft (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1962); and Ulrike Riemer, Das Caesarbild 
Ciceros (Hamburg: Kovać, 2001). However, as I pursue this topic further in the Ph. D. program (Classics) of the 
University of California at Santa Barbara, I will acquire German and be able to include these works and others in my 
work. Meanwhile, I have included the main aspects of their problematicamicitia in this M.A. thesis. 
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This was not uncommon and consuls usually became governors of provinces to recoup these 
losses.  Caesar had it arranged that he could become governor of Gaul in 58 for an unprecedented 
ten years and quickly began to conquer the territory tribe by tribe.  Meanwhile, Cicero went into 
exile in 58 because of a law aimed directly to force him out of Rome but was able to return in 
large part because of the influence of Pompey in 57.  In 51, he (begrudgingly) accepted the 
governorship of Cilicia, since there was a shortage of candidates because of a law that required 
five years between a consulship and governorship, from which he returned in 50.  It was at this 
time that the senate denied Caesar’s request to run for consul in absentia.  In Caesar’s public 
career, he had angered many senators and aristocrats, but they could not charge him with a crime 
while he held public office.  Having been denied the right to run for consulship, and with his rule 
in Gaul expiring, Caesar was forced into a corner.  Pompey and the senate ordered Caesar to 
disband his army and return to Rome.  Caesar agreed with the caveat that Pompey too must 
disband his.  Pompey refused.  As Caesar crossed the Rubicon in January of 49, Pompey and the 
majority of the senate fled south to Brundisium where he then fled to Greece, and was eventually 
followed by Cicero.  After marching to Spain and defeating Pompey’s men there, Caesar 
returned to Italy and pursued Pompey to Greece.  Caesar was nearly defeated in July of 48 at 
Dyrrhachium, but managed to escape where he routed Pompey at Pharsalus on August 9, 48.   
 After Pharsalus, Pompey fled to Egypt and was assassinated by the men of Ptolemy XIII.  
Cicero realized the cause was lost, and began to establish peace with Caesar, which Caesar 
accepted.  Caesar pursued Pompey and while in Egypt, established Cleopatra on the throne in 47 
after a prolonged siege of Alexandria.  After this, Caesar mopped up the rest of Pompey’s forces 
in the Mediterranean and returned to Rome in 46 where the senate appointed him dictator for ten 
years.  Caesar was forced to march to Spain in 45 to deal with Pompey’s sons.  Caesar returned 
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to Italy in September of 45 and began trying to reform many of the problems that plagued Rome.  
During this time Caesar seemed to be leaning towards establishing himself as a dictator, and was 
declared dictator in perpetuity (dictator perpetuus) in February,44 after serving defined terms as 
dictator in 49, 48, 46, and 45.  On March 15, 44, a group of conspirators, which did not include 
Cicero, assassinated Caesar.  Despite the expectations of men like Brutus and Cassius, this 
assassination only led to more chaos and the rise to power of Mark Antony and Octavian.  Cicero 
was killed on December 7, 43 under an agreement between the two triumvirs. 
      
Amicitia  
It is important to discuss the problematic Roman term for “friendship,” amicitia, and its 
implications. The Latin amicitia shares its root with other words associated with affection, such 
as amicus (friend) and amare (to love), so English speakers have the tendency to associate 
amicitia with personal friendship, which is not entirely accurate. The translation of amicitia as 
friendship is not inaccurate, but the Romans used this word to describe other relationships as 
well, such as political alliances. English speakers have the option of describing a close 
relationship with different words that all possess unique connotations: friend, associate, pal, 
business partner, and so on. The Romans likewise had a similar range of words (familiaris, 
comites) but could also use amicus to describe all of these relationships; this polyvalence creates 
complications. The range of meanings presents problems for the historian; amicitia can mean 
personal friendship and political alliance.  This problem is inherent in the historiographical use 
of the term.  In an effort to be more accurate I will simply use amicitia for Roman political 
contexts in this essay.   
 Historians typically saw amicitia not as a bond between friends, but essentially as a 
political alliance that held very little, or perhaps no, personal affection. In 1939, for example, 
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Syme stated, “Family wealth and influence did not alone suffice…amicitia was a weapon of 
politics, not a sentiment based on congeniality.”2 Many historians did not consider amicitia as a 
form of what we call “friendship”. Rather, amicitiae were informal alliances and promises made 
by politicians to support one another regarding political issues on which they agreed.  For the 
most part, this was the accepted opinion of historians until P.A. Brunt put Roman amicitia in a 
new light.
3
 Unlike previous historians who either had ignored Cicero’s de Amicitia or did not 
find it a reliable source, Brunt worked directly with this essay to show that, at least according to 
Cicero, amicitia could be much more than a simple political alliance, and that political alliances 
grew from feelings of good will, not vice versa. As a result, scholars in diverse fields, such as 
sociology, political science, and history, have warmed to Brunt’s definition of amicitia.4 These 
arguments still do not solve the riddle of translating amicitia. The term can mean political 
alliance or bosom friendship, and all the minute shades of difference between these extremes.  In 
the end, I will look at de Amicitia for help in understanding Cicero’s attitude towards political 
amicitia at the time he was writing that work.   The term amicitia complicates the relationship 
between Caesar and Cicero.  The initial reaction for some historians might be to use the word in 
the more modern sense, that is, a personal friendship.  But there is little evidence to suggest that 
Cicero and Caesar were personal friends.  From their initial conflict during the Catilinarian 
conspiracy to Caesar’s assassination, their relationship was tenuous. It is incorrect then to state 
that the two were personal friends.  Simultaneously, the two were rarely ever on the same side 
politically, so it is equally difficult to say that their amicitia was for a political alliance.  We must 
look between the two extremes.  The amicitia between Caesar and Cicero was one of necessity; 
Cicero needed to please Caesar because of his power, while Caesar needed Cicero’s support to 
                                                 
2
 Syme, (1939), 12.   
3
 Brunt, (1988), 352-381. 
4
 Rawson, (1978), 3; Von Heyking and Avramenko, (2008), 84-85; Wood, (1988), 182-183; Burton, (2011), 28-32. 
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legitimize his own actions.  Caesar’s rise to power created an unprecedented political situation, 
which strained established social and political relationships: Cicero was searching for a new 
social/political form of amicitia to fit the new situation.   As we will see later, they are able to get 
along when discussing topics such as literature, but when trying to maintain their pleasantries 
they avoided discussing politics.
5
  Their amicitia was strong in that it lasted through such 
existential threats to both men's lives and careers, even if the political dimension of it was 
sustained through the appearance of elements of personal friendship based on things like 
literature. 
 Cicero left three forms of his writings for posterity, his letters, speeches, and 
philosophica, and it is with these documents that I have endeavored to discover the nature  of the 
relationship between Cicero and Caesar.  Each can be useful but also present unique challenges.  
Cicero’s letters are perhaps the least problematic of the group, as many of them were written to 
close friends, and Cicero was able to be rather open regarding his inner thoughts.  I believe that 
from these letters we will see Cicero at his most candid and can remove the veneer of politeness 
and reverence to discover the thoughts that were coursing through Cicero’s head regarding 
Caesar.  This will not be the first study on Cicero’s letters, as several books, such as Peter 
White’s Cicero in Letters, have examined the letters for the information regarding epistolary 
trends in Rome.
6
  While this is an excellent book, it does not focus on the study of Cicero as a 
person and his relations with anyone in particular, but is more interested in Rome itself.  There 
have also been other articles or chapters relating to Cicero and Caesar’s letters, but again they do 
not focus on the relationship between the two men.
7
  This absence leaves a good deal of work to 
                                                 
5
 I do not rule out the possibility that there was a closer amicitia between the two, but there is little evidence to 
support such a hypothesis, and it can never be proved.     
6
 White, (2010). 
7
 See Pauli (1958), 128; White, (2003). 
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be done and many questions to be asked.  There are difficulties in examining these letters that 
must be considered however.  For instance, the sheer quantity makes it impossible, in a space 
such as this, to examine them all as closely as they deserve.  There are also issues of sincerity 
and interception that the researcher must remember.   
 Cicero was the greatest orator of his time, and it is fortunate that Caesar was aware of his 
reputation and subsequently took advantage of Cicero’s notoriety.  Three speeches in particular 
are relevant to this thesis, the so-called three Caesarian speeches that Cicero delivered in 46 and 
45 to Caesar.  Although they are generally full of praise for Caesar, there is certainly reason to 
doubt Cicero’s sincerity.  Scholars have debated Cicero’s genuineness in these speeches for 
decades, with Harold Gotoff supplying the most in-depth work on all three speeches.
8
  But for 
the most part, they have been studied as individual units and not as a united series, though they 
are often grouped together.  By studying these three speeches in chronological order, one can 
find a change in tone from the first speech to the last. 
 
Hypothesis about Reading the de Amicitia 
 
 The final source that I will interrogate here will be Cicero’s philosophy of amicitia.  
Following the death of the republic and Tullia, his daughter, Cicero devoted himself almost 
entirely to philosophy.  Because Cicero wrote so many philosophica, much of which does not 
pertain to this topic, I will examine one aspect only of the de Amicitia.  Cicero’s treatise will 
reveal what Cicero considered important for friends, and his thoughts on how personal 
friendships are formed and destroyed.  From this information, we can discern whether or not 
Cicero would have considered Caesar a friend. Cicero also wrote this treatise within six months 
of Caesar’s death, and may have subtly reflected on the issues that bore on his relationship with 
                                                 
8
 Gotoff, (1993). 
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Caesar.  There are of course hazards to this approach, primarily that the text was not meant to be 
read biographically, and doing so has the ability to mislead the reader.  But it was a document 
written by Cicero about amicitia, and if he was sincere, then some of his reflections can be 
brought to bear to understand his relationship with Caesar.   
 All of these sources have their limitations, but collectively they have the potential to 
illuminate Cicero’s attitudes towards Caesar during the important years of his rise to power.  
They all present their own unique vantage points to view the relationship between Cicero and 
Caesar, and some in fact are contradictory at some places and coherent in others.  It is often 
difficult to reconcile these problems without reverting to the all-too-easy excuse that Cicero was 
conflicted in his attitudes towards Caesar, yet this is precisely what I hope to show.  Previous 
scholars have turned Cicero into a figure who saw the world in extremes, and had no love for the 
man who toppled the republic.  Yet this thesis will show that Cicero was a more complicated 
man than that, and that his amicitia with Caesar remained in Cicero even after he had given up 
hope for a rebirth of the republic.        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Chapter 1: Cicero’s Letters: Working Out Amicitia 
 
In Rome, many letters, even private ones, were written for public consumption by friends 
with the knowledge that they may fall into the hands of enemies.  This can be problematic for 
historians analyzing personal relationships, no matter who the correspondents are.  The problem 
is even more difficult if the writer, addressee, or subject is the powerful general and politician, 
who would become dictator, Caesar.  That so many letters of Cicero still exist is rather 
astonishing.  An astounding 900 survive.  If not for these letters, Cicero, his contemporaries, and 
his time would be much less clear to us.  More importantly for this chapter, his personal thoughts 
on public matters would be lost.  Cicero’s superficially favorable disposition towards Caesar 
declines during the civil war, temporarily rises, then plummets after Caesar’s assassination, 
leaving Cicero in a complicated state of mind.   
Many of Cicero’s letters after Caesar crossed the Rubicon in 49 have some mention of 
Caesar or the tumultuous political situation in Rome.  I cannot analyze them all in this chapter 
(and thesis), and so I have chosen particular letters that appear to reveal the most about Cicero’s 
attitudes towards Caesar.  There are many more letters than the ones I have selected that deal 
with this topic, but I have chosen those that I believe contain the most information regarding 
their amicitia.  In doing so, I have tried to establish the fluctuations in amicitia between the two 
men, and show Cicero’s personal conflict.  There is still more work to be done in this area and 
more study of these letters is suggested for future research.   
 Before continuing, I must establish the basic facts surrounding these letters.  About 900 
of Cicero’s letters are still extant, and they are divided into four groups, ad Atticum (68-44), ad 
Familiares (62-43), ad Quintum fratrem (60-54), and ad Brutum (43) (To Atticus, To Friends, To 
 10 
 
Quintus, and To Brutus.)  It is impossible to know how many letters have been lost, but Pauli 
lists several other books that ancient authors mentioned: ad Senatum, ad Ciceronem, ad 
Caesarem, and ad Caesarem iuniorem (ad Caesarem was at least three volumes).9  Given the 
number of these collections, it is likely that more volumes existed in the past but have been lost.  
This chapter will focus on ad Quintum Fratrem, ad Atticum and ad Familiares (ad Brutum falls 
outside of the scope of this thesis).  In the following pages, I will examine select letters in ad 
Quintum, ad Familiares, and ad Atticum.  In order to preserve the epistolary narrative that 
underlies the letters to each group of recipients, I will present the collections separately, noting 
some internal references to one another.  This approach will allow the reader to understand better 
the complicated and constantly changing views that Cicero held towards Caesar beginning from 
Caesar’s time in Gaul in 58 until his death in 44.  The majority of letters to Quintus, Cicero’s 
brother who served in Gaul under Caesar and thus was close both physically and personally, fall 
outside of the period of this paper but are included to establish the degree of amicitia between 
Caesar and Cicero.  Ad Familiares offers an interesting viewpoint that the other two collections 
lack; it contains letters to a diverse group of people, some whom Cicero considered close friends, 
others merely associates.  Cicero’s enthusiasm, sarcasm, and sincerity differ depending on the 
letter’s recipient and his sincerity needs to be gauged when we read these letters.  Finally, 
Cicero’s letters to Atticus may be the most revealing of all.  Atticus was Cicero’s closest friend 
throughout his life, and therefore the person with whom Cicero was probably the most candid.  
With Atticus, Cicero had no secrets and nothing to lose; his comments with Atticus are the least 
likely to hide his thoughts. 
   
                                                 
9
 Pauli, (1958), 128-29.  
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Considerations Reading the Letters 
 Cicero’s letters present many problems of authenticity and interpretation, and it is 
important to examine and understand some of these analytical problems before continuing on to 
the letters themselves.  Scholars have studied the letters extensively,  and by analyzing them as a 
unit, they have found common occurrences and themes.  One of the most important works on the 
topic of Cicero’s letters is Peter White’s Cicero in Letters.10  This book tackles many important 
questions when examining letters, such as bias, currying favor, and giving advice.  Amanda 
Wilcox takes a less general approach and looks at friendship in select letters.11  Other scholars, 
most notably Shackleton Bailey, have used the letters to create biographies of Cicero.12  There 
are more important works that will be discussed, and much of the research has dealt with 
important but peripheral questions.    Without these works, the task of analyzing these letters 
would be exceedingly difficult.  The topics that I will examine are the initial publication of the 
letters viewed by modern historicans, the role of the letter, and sincerity and privacy in letters.  
  We do not know who originally collected and publicly circulated Cicero’s letters, but 
we can tell, to some extent, who did not.  Logic dictates that Atticus had some role in their 
publication, since Cicero addressed a vast amount of them to him, and in one such letter he 
indicated Atticus’s interest in collecting and publishing them.  Yet, there is no firm evidence that 
Atticus actually published them, and there is even evidence that by 30 BC they were still 
unpublished; Cornelius Nepos could only see them when he visited Atticus’s home.  The first 
solid evidence of the publication of at least some of Cicero’s letters occurs in Seneca the 
Younger’s de Brevitate vitae (58 AD), in which he quotes them and examines the presence of the 
                                                 
10
 White, (2010).   
11
 Wilcox, (2012). 
12
 Shackleton Bailey, (1972). 
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word semiliber (half free), and then later he again cites them in his Epistulae morales.
13
  A more 
likely scenario for the publication of the letters is that Cicero’s freedman Tiro was responsible 
for their dissemination.  As Cicero’s secretary he was in a unique position to organize and 
maintain the letters of his former master.  That book XVI of ad Familiares is exclusively 
devoted to the letters Cicero wrote to Tiro is further evidence for this idea, since these letters 
were not numerous and they could easily have been placed elsewhere in the collection.
14
  
Furthermore, these letters do not contain much pertinent information regarding Cicero; many of 
them are simply Cicero expressing concern for the health of Tiro.  Generally, scholars agree that 
Tiro was likely the first to publish Cicero’s extant letters, though in truth we can never know for 
sure.  
Mary Beard offered an interesting insight into the reading of these letters.  Instead of 
looking at them as mere correspondence, she reads them as literature and examines how their 
publication affects the way in which they are read, from the original publications that are divided 
into multiple volumes by subject, to the modern editions that organize the letters chronologically, 
an approach followed by G.O. Hutchinson as well.
15
  Note also that the intent of the publisher, 
that is, publishing his letters as examples of literary style or as records of Cicero’s life in politics, 
may have affected which letters or parts of letters were selected for publication (and which 
suppressed).  Furthermore, the ordering of letters could have a significant effect on how the 
reader receives them vis-á-vis their historical interpretation.  Beard contends that by ordering the 
letters chronologically, readers lose the “episodic narrative” that the original publication 
created.
16
  She contends that the greatest problem with the new organization occurs in ad 
                                                 
13
 Nicholson, (1994-1995), 66, 69, 71.   
14
 Beard, ( 2002), 131.   
15
 Beard, (2002); see Hutchinson, (1998), 4.   
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Familiares where letters are jumbled and it is difficult for the reader to keep the events straight, 
unless cross references in the edition allow the reader to follow the chain of correspondences and 
mitigate this problem.  This confusion is less of a problem with ad Atticum as those letters are 
directed to one person and there is a linear narrative.  When trying to construct Cicero’s views, it 
is a hard task to keep track of all his related thematic statements and compare each narrative to 
another.     
For Roman politicians, socializing was an important and necessary aspect of their day for 
several reasons.  While present in Rome, lower ranking senators were expected to visit their 
patrons and prominent senators every morning to show their support and try to establish a certain 
level of amicitia for themselves in the hopes of furthering their own careers as well as supporting 
those of their patrons.  These lower ranking senators could also meet in the forum, attend dinner 
parties, and appear at a variety of other social occasions.
17
  When Cicero went into exile, or 
served as proconsul in Cilicia, these avenues of socialization were unavailable, but he did not 
want to see himself forgotten by his colleagues in Rome nor lose contact with his friends or 
loved ones.  The letter was an important device for maintaining contacts, not only for Cicero, but 
also for Romans in general, and it had to serve several purposes, some of which were difficult to 
balance.  
Cicero’s formal public amicitia with Caesar reached its apogee when Caesar was in Gaul.  
Letters sent to one another, full of compliments, unite them on the surface.
18
  Letter writing is a 
way to build and maintain amicitia, as Cicero later writes to Quintus in September, 54, “ego vero 
nullas  habere possum in Caesaris rebus. ille mihi secundum te et liberos 
nostros ita est ut sit paene par” (“Really I am not able to have any ‘second thoughts’ in matters of 
                                                 
17
 White, (2010), 18. 
18
 For instance see ad Att. II.13.3, III.1.17   
 14 
 
Caesar. To me he is second to you and our children, so that he is nearly equal [to them].”)19  
Though Caesar was absent from Rome for nearly a decade, Cicero built an amicitia with him that 
appeared to equal that of his closest confidants and loved ones.  There is room for doubt 
however.  In an era with no postal service or laws prohibiting the reading of another’s letter, 
privacy in letter writing was a constant question.  It is necessary to address whether Cicero was 
simply trying to curry favor with Caesar by managing public opinion through his letters, which 
he expected to be read by more than just the addressee.                            
The time between the writing and receiving of a letter was a period in which the letter 
could be read and disseminated by any interested party, which raises the question of sincerity in 
letters.  Cicero was less likely to be candid in his letters if he knew that important or damning 
information in them could be intercepted.  As internal evidence in his letters reveals, Cicero was 
indeed aware of this possibility, and took several measures to prevent it.  His first option was to 
use letter carriers (called tabellarii) that he could trust, either in his own employ or in that of his 
correspondent.  The lack of reliable messengers is something Cicero often lamented, “obsignata 
iam epistula superiore non placuit ei dari cui constitueram quod erat alienus. itaque eo die data 
non est.” (“Now with the previous letter sealed, it did not please me for it to be given to the man 
whom I had decided on because he was an outsider.  Therefore it was not sent that day.”)20  
Trustworthy messengers were also somewhat rare, as Cicero complained to Atticus, “paucis 
diebus habebam certos homines cui darem litteras.” (“Within a few days I would have 
trustworthy people to whom I could give the letter.”)21  Cicero is apparently able to find reliable 
messengers at times, since letters do get sent to Atticus and other friends.  When Cicero wanted 
to send a letter to Quintus who was encamped with Caesar, or to Caesar himself, the process was 
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both simpler and more complicated.  As John Nicholson explains, it was difficult for Cicero to 
send a letter to a party that was constantly on the move, perhaps a reason why Cicero was so 
eager to use the messengers of Caesar when they were in Rome.
22
   
 Simply because messengers were trusted however did not mean that the messages were 
safe.  Spying and privacy were issues of which Cicero was certainly aware. In a letter to Quintus 
in September of 54, Cicero writes, “De publicis negotiis, quae vis ad te Tironem scribere, 
negligentius ad te ante scribebam, quod omnia minima maxima ad Caesarem mitti sciebam” 
(“Regarding the public business, which you want Tiro to write to you, I previously used to write 
to you less attentively, because I knew that everything great and small was being sent to 
Caesar.”)23  This awareness should not be too shocking, as this letter was written to Quintus 
while he was in Caesar’s camp.  It is perhaps not surprising that Caesar would have men 
inspecting letters.  This level of espionage apparently continued into the civil war as well, as 
Cicero tells Atticus in 49, “et res ipsa monebat et tu ostenderas et ego videbam, de iis rebus quas 
intercipi periculosum esset finem inter nos scribendi fieri tempus esse” (“The situation itself 
advised it, you had showed it, and I saw that the time for writing between us was at an end 
concerning those matters which would be dangerous to have intercepted.”)24  Caesar had “ears” 
out during his fight against Pompey, though they were not an organized body, but informal spies.  
Cicero’s solution to this problem was not to lie, but to omit the information in his 
correspondence with Atticus, a practice he mentioned earlier in a letter to Quintus.
25
  We may 
assume then that most, if not all, praise that Cicero gives to anyone, including Caesar, in his 
letters is what he chose to write, however guardedly, just as when he occasionally tried to send 
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private messages.  What we cannot know is how much and what Cicero felt but did not write, or 
to what extent he censored himself.     
 Scholars such as Nicholson have posited that Cicero used Greek in his letters to deal with 
the problem of his letters falling into hostile hands.
26
  While that inference may be correct to 
some extent, I cannot believe that Cicero relied on this method as a secure way to keep secrets.  
Greek was well-known during this period, and his use of Greek words and phrases is stylish and 
adds grace notes to his letters, similar to French in English letters in past centuries.  Not only 
were elite Romans educated in Greek, but also many slaves (and couriers) were often native 
Greeks.  If information in Greek needed to be translated, it would not be difficult for an elite 
Roman or someone close to him to do it.  More pointedly, Caesar knew Greek.  His messengers 
or his other staff could easily decipher any messages in Greek, as Cicero surely knew.   There is 
another possible reason for Cicero’s use of Greek however.  Cicero may have used Greek to 
allude to works of Greek literature and philosophy discussed in his circle of intellectual friends.  
This would provide a layer of meaning inaccessible even to those who might pick up on the 
reference . That is, even if Caesar knew the Platonic dialogue from which an allusion came, he 
would have to guess how Cicero's friends thought about the scene.  Even if he had his ideas 
about that, it would give plausible deniability to Cicero.    
 Cicero was aware that if he wrote something in a letter, it was likely that someone could 
read it and potentially use it against him.  For the most part his solution to this problem was 
relatively simple: he did not write anything that could be used against him, and only gave 
important messages to people whom he trusted to deliver them.  This solution seemed to work 
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for him, as he was only identified as a criminal by Publius Clodius Pulcher, a personal enemy 
(inimicus), after Cicero executed the conspirators in the Catilinarian conspiracy, and by Antony 
as vengeance for the Philippica.  Cicero’s enemies were only able to prosecute him for his public 
deeds, not private correspondence.  There is no evidence of him stating anything falsely or 
contradicting himself in his letters.  Cicero seems to have lived by the creed to only say nice (but 
likely sincere) things until he was able to speak out publicly against someone or something.   
 
Cicero and Caesar’s Letters  
Despite the survival of over 900 of Cicero’s letters, the greatest tragedy for this thesis is 
the loss of ad Caesarem.  What we know of these letters comes from the writings of Nonius 
Marcellus.  It is impossible to estimate accurately how many letters the two sent to one another, 
but we have evidence of approximately thirty-four letters.
27
  Many of Cicero’s letters to Caesar 
in Gaul were merely praise or treated casual matters, though he frequently sent Caesar news and 
talk of other affairs, as Cicero acknowledged.28  Two letters that Cicero wrote in 45 still survive, 
and both are letters of recommendation.  Letters from Caesar still exist as well, as Cicero either 
preserved them or copied a few of them in letters to Atticus (he almost always mentions that he 
is attaching a letter even when the attachment has been lost).29  The first of these letters has 
Caesar writing to Cicero that he is looking forward to hearing his advice and wisdom on the 
ensuing civil war; the second has Caesar thanking Cicero for his kind words regarding his policy 
of clemency and again expresses a desire to hear his counsel.  Caesar wrote the third as he was 
marching to Spain, telling Cicero to stay out of the political fray and lie low and not do anything 
contradictory to Caesar’s wishes.  These letters are predictably full of warm, cajoling sentiments 
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for Cicero, and Caesar obviously considers Cicero an important associate, or at least is trying to 
portray that image.  This warmth did not fool Cicero. He seems to have read into each word that 
Caesar wrote, as a series of letters show.
30
  After Cicero received Caesar’s letter in ad Att. 9.6A, 
he questioned Caesar’s phrasing.  In this letter Caesar says, “...ut te ibi videam, ut tuo consilio, 
gratia, dignitate, ope omnium rerum uti possim” (“...that I will see you there [Rome], so that I 
will be able to employ your counsel, grace, dignity, and help in all matters”).  Cicero did not 
know if this was a summons or simply a suggestion, and thus he reveals a level of fear of 
Caesar’s power.31    
 Cicero’s few surviving letters of recommendation to Caesar later read as cold and 
detached, which does not mean that their amicitia had ended entirely.  When Tullia died in 45, 
Caesar sent a letter of condolence to Cicero expressing his sadness, and later he sent another 
complimentary letter praising one another’s opposing works on Cato.32  By 45, little veneer of 
support for Caesar’s rule by Cicero remained.  Peter White questions the sincerity of these 
letters.  In his essay on the Caesarian letters, White argues that they show how Caesar used and 
manipulated both Cicero and Roman politicians in general; not only Caesar used this veil of 
warmth and kindness to his advantage.  White points out that Cicero had complimented Caesar in 
order to get what he wanted: his return to Rome and the return of those whom Caesar exiled. 33  
In support of this interpretation, it may be noted that Cicero was aware of what Caesar could do 
to help him.  Favors were simply a formal part of amicitia in Rome.  Cicero (and likely Romans 
in general) did not see this exchange of favors as manipulative in any negative sense but as one 
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of the reasons for amicitia.              
  
ad Quintum fratrem  
 While Caesar was serving in his second five-year term in Gaul from 53-49, Cicero 
remained in either Rome or Cilicia and was beginning to focus on his literary pursuits.  The 
existence of amicitia between the two men at this point then might seem unlikely, but amicitia 
did in fact grow between them during this period.  I have not yet discussed the intricacies.  
Beginning with a letter dated approximately February 10, 54, Cicero began to discuss his 
relationship with Caesar while he was in Gaul, and though amicitia does appear between Cicero 
and Caesar, there is a distinct air of building upon that amicitia for purely political and tactical 
purposes.34  Cicero describes his conversation in a letter to Caesar as conducted, “familiariter et 
cum dignitate” (“...familiarly and with dignity...”)35  His express tone, therefore, contrasts with 
his real reasons for his seeking/perpetuating amicitia, that is, his purely political reasons. It is 
interesting that Cicero included dignitas.  Dignitas is not always the most important personality 
or social trait to establish between friends. While Cicero was enforcing his public appearance of 
amicitia with Caesar he also wanted to appear as a strong political figure in his own right.  
Whatever the case, Cicero’s next letter, written February 13, 54, to his brother expresses a more 
functional closeness between himself and Caesar, “de Pompeio adsentior tibi, vel tu potius mihi. 
nam, ut scis, iam pridem istum canto Caesarem. mihi crede, in sinu est neque ego discingor” 
(“Regarding Pompey I agree with you, or rather you agree with me. For, you know, I have long 
been singing about that Caesar of yours.  Believe me, he is in my heart, and I am not removing 
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him.”)36  It is necessary to remember the circumstances of Cicero’s writing.  This letter was sent 
to Caesar’s military camp, a place where Caesar had imperium, and may well have been made 
aware of all the most important events and news in the camp.  It is possible that Cicero expected 
agents to intercept this letter and report its contents to Caesar.  Cicero also reveals in another 
letter that he has lost popularity with some senators for the development of his connection with 
Caesar.37   
In ad Quint. II.14, dated as early June 54, Cicero begins, “accepi tuas litteras datas 
Placentia, deinde alteras postridie datas Blandenone cum Caesaris litteris refertis omni officio, 
diligentia, suavitate.” (“I received the letter you sent from Placentia, then a second sent a day 
later from Blandeno
38
 together with Caesar’s letter filled with all dutiful, diligent, and pleasant 
attention.”) and goes on to state (rather poetically) , “sic ego, quoniam in isto homine colendo 
tam indormivi diu te mehercule saepe excitante, cursu corrigam tarditatem cum equis tum vero, 
quoniam tu scribis poema ab eo nostrum probari, quadrigis poeticis” (“Thus, because in 
cultivating that man’s friendship, I have so long been asleep, by Hercules, with you often trying 
to rouse me, I will fix my slowness with horses at the gallop, well, really by a poetic four horse 
chariot, because you write that my poem is approved by him [Caesar].”)39  Though Caesar is not 
in Rome, Cicero plans to use the medium of a letter (and poetry) to build upon his fledgling 
amicitia with Caesar, while also keeping in contact with his brother.  Cicero’s use of isto 
however does reveal that he still sees a separation between himself and Caesar.  While isto is the 
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ablative of iste, translated as “that”, when used addressing someone else it can often mean “that 
man of yours.”  This allows the reader to realize that there is still a gap between the speaker, and 
the subject, in this case Caesar.  Caesar belongs (for lack of a better word) to Quintus at this 
point in time, not Cicero.  Yet the two were forming a public amicitia that other Roman 
politicians were talking about by December of 54.40 
 The most interesting aspect of this series of letters however, is the mutual interest that 
Caesar and Cicero share in one another’s literary work.  Ad Quint. II.16 (August, 54) contains the 
first mention of their literary works, but this theme is surprisingly prevalent throughout their 
correspondence, even later when Caesar became dictator.  Cicero is interested in Caesar’s 
critique of his writing, saying, “quo modo nam, mi frater, de nostris versibus Caesar?  Nam 
primum librum se legisse scripsit ad me ante, et prima sic ut neget se ne Graeca quidem meliora 
legisse; reliqua ad quondam locum  (hoc enim utitur verbo)” (“For how, my brother, 
is Caesar about my verses?  For he wrote to me before that he had read the first book, and with 
the result that he says that he had not read better introductory parts even in Greek. The rest he 
had read to a certain spot, ‘rather modest’—for he uses this word.”)41  There is no other mention 
of shared verses between Cicero and Caesar, but as time continued, the two became more 
dependent on their literary ties as the expression of their public amicitia; because they belonged 
to different factions, politics was not possible. Cicero expresses distress at the death of Caesar’s 
daughter Julia in 54,  and later in the year he claims that Caesar is the only man who cares 
(“amaret”) for him.42  Though scholars doubt the sincerity of Cicero’s feelings, Shackleton 
Bailey believes, as do I, that Caesar’s desire to establish a public amicitia, if not a true, personal 
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amicitia, was sincere.
43
 From these letters it seems that by the time that Cicero left for Cilicia in 
51-50, he and Caesar were maintaining their public amicitia,  and yet this could all be mere 
posturing since Cicero’s letters were sent to Quintus in Caesar’s camp, and he expected the 
imperator either to read them, or have their contents reported to him.  It is important to reiterate 
here that these letters to Quintus are dated to the mid to late fifties and therefore belong to the 
period not long before the Rubicon and its aftermath, which is our primary concern.  
 
ad Familiares  
 Cicero’s letters to Quintus present problems for this paper.  In addition to posing valid 
questions about Cicero’s sincerity, the time span of these letters (60-54) is relatively short and 
does not encompass the time up to Caesar’s death.  Both ad Familiares and ad Atticum avoid 
these problems of interpretation to some extent, though questions of sincerity must arise with 
these letters too.  There are exceptions, but Cicero rarely discusses Caesar directly in ad 
Familiares; he mentions him in passing when describing events in Rome.  This arrangement 
allows him to express himself more candidly than was possible in his letters to Quintus.  The first 
few letters under consideration give information about the impending civil war but have little to 
do with Caesar and more to do with Pompey.  In ad Fam. II.8 Cicero writes to M. Caelius and 
praises Pompey’s patriotism (“civem egregium esse Pompeium” “Pompey is a distinguished 
citizen”) but in ad Att. VIII.11 (February 27, 49) states, 
dominatio quaesita ab utroque est, non id actum, beata et honesta civitas ut esset.  
nec vero ille urbem reliquit quod eam tueri non posset nec Italiam quod ea 
pelleretur, sed hoc a primo cogitavit, omnis terras, omnia maria movere, reges 
barbaros incitare, gentis feras in Italiam armatas adducere, exercitus conficere 
maximos.  genus illud Sullani regni iam pridem appetitur...uterque regnare vult.
44
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Mastery has been sought by both [Caesar and Pompey]; that was not done so that 
the state is taken care of.  Neither indeed did he abandon the city because he could 
not protect it nor Italy because he was driven from  it, but from the beginning he 
thought to move all land and sea, to incite barbarian kings, to induce the wild and 
armed tribes against Italy, to procure the greatest armies.  For a long time that 
kind of Sullan rule was sought…both want to be king.              
 
 Cicero was not thrilled with the idea of either combatant winning the war, which makes more 
tolerable Caelius Rufus’s doubts about Pompey’s ability as a politician (“solet enim aliud sentire 
et loqui neque tantum valere ingenio ut non appareat quid cupiat…” “For he is accustomed to 
feel and speak something else yet he is not so clever that what he wants does not appear.”)45  
Cicero supplied news to his friends about events in Rome, yet provides very little of his opinions 
on Caesar’s actions at this point. 
When Caelius Rufus writes to Cicero discussing Caesar, he expresses confidence in 
Caesar’s judgment, and he does not make explicit his fear that Caesar will lead the republic into 
civil war when he says in 51, “itaque iam, ut video, alteram utram ad condicionem descendere 
vult Caesar, ut aut maneat neque hoc anno sua ratio habeatur aut, si designari poterit, decedat.” 46 
(“And so now, as I see, Caesar is willing come down on one or the other agreement, either to 
remain [in Gaul] and his vetting will not be held this year, or if he can be elected, to step down 
[from command].”)47  A few lines earlier he states that this is the general opinion throughout the 
senators and that Caesar was working for a peace with Pompey. It is possible, even probable, that 
Cicero too hoped that Caesar might still not plunge the republic into civil war. This is a revealing 
point.  Cicero, whatever his politics, was a staunch supporter of the republic and of maintaining 
the constitution that had helped Rome become great.  He hoped that Caesar would not betray the 
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republic.  To some extent, hope shows the limits of the amicitia Cicero expressed in the letters to 
his brother.  Cicero was anxious to avoid the civil war that now seemed imminent.    
 By August of 50 Cicero was worried regarding the events taking place in Rome.  In a 
letter to Caelius Rufus, whom Cicero had defended in the past, he stated his position plainly, 
“Res publica me valde sollicitat. Faveo Curioni, Caesarem honestum esse cupio, pro Pompeio 
emori possum, sed tamen ipsa re publica nihil mihi est carius; in qua tu non valde te iactas. 
Districtus enim mihi videris esse, quod et bonus civis et bonus amicus es
48
.” (“Politics worries 
me very much. I favor Curio, I want Caesar to be upright, I can die for Pompey, but nevertheless 
nothing is more dear to me than the republic itself; you do not talk very much of yourself in it.  
For you seem to me to be pulled in different directions, because you are a good citizen and a 
good friend [amicus].”)49  Cicero imagines Caelius to be torn, and he himself must be feeling 
similarly.  As we have seen, there was to that point some veneer of amicitia between Cicero and 
Caesar. In this passage Cicero states his vain hope for Caesar and his loyalty for Pompey.  This 
passage marks the depth of Cicero’s internal conflict, even when he is still proconsul in Cilicia 
leading his troops.  In the next letter, written to M. Caelius on the Nones of May 49, Cicero 
details both his inner turmoil and his decision-making process more overtly: 
 
Sic illi amores et invidiosa coniunctio non ad occultam recidit obtrectationem, sed 
ad bellum se erumpit. Neque, mearum rerum quid consilii capiam, reperio—quod 
non dubito quin te quoque haec deliberatio sit perturbatura—; nam mihi cum 
hominibus his et gratia et necessitudo; tum causam illam, non homines odi. Illud 
te non arbitror fugere, quin homines in dissensione domestica debeant, quamdiu 
civiliter sine armis certetur, honestiorem sequi partem, ubi ad bellum et castra 
ventum sit, firmiorem, et id melius statuere, quod tutius sit. In hac discordia video 
Cn. Pompeium senatum quique res iudicant secum habiturum, ad Caesarem 
omnes, qui cum timore aut mala spe vivant, accessuros; exercitum conferendum 
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non esse.50    
 
So, that love of theirs, their hateful union, has not subsided into secret caviling but 
is breaking out into war.  Nor can I find what plan I should make for my own 
actions--as for this, I don’t doubt but that this [same] choice is going to upset you.  
For I have favor and a tie with these people.  But then I hate that cause of theirs, 
not the people.  I do not think you are avoiding the following consideration, that 
in domestic discord so long as the fighting is civil and without arms, people ought 
to follow the more upright party, but the stronger one when it has come to armed 
warfare and to consider as better that which is safer.  In this disagreement I see 
that Cn. Pompey will have with him the senate and those who judge trials, and 
that everyone who lives in fear and with depraved hope will go to Caesar; [I see] 
that his army is incomparable.          
 
Cicero is convinced that Pompey’s cause is the just one, but that his forces lack strength. 
 In January of 49, Caesar crossed the Rubicon and, by decree of the senate, became an 
enemy to Rome.  Later on, in a letter to Tiro written in 49 while Cicero waited outside of Rome 
for his triumph, and called Caesar’s action shameless (impudens), and also refers to Caesar 
(ironically)  in apposition as “amicus noster” (“our friend”).51  Yet a few days later Cicero still 
discusses hopefully the prospect of peace between the two factions.
52
  But Cicero then describes 
to Tiro the abandonment of Rome as “urbem reliquimus” (“we abandoned Rome”); the use of the 
first person plural is significant here.  Pompey’s forces are no longer they, but we.53  A letter 
from Caelius Rufus on the Ides of March, 49, may indicate that confidence was lacking in 
Pompey, as Caelius calls him a “hominem ineptiorem,” (“a rather inept human being”).54  
Caelius is using provocative language to upset Cicero.  In another letter to M. Caelius, dated the 
Nones of May, 49, Cicero implies that Caesar is the rising sun, while Pompey is a sun that is 
setting or has already set 
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ut existimares aut me tam improvidum qui ab excitata fortuna ad inclinatam et 
prope iacentem desciscerem, aut tam inconstantem, ut conlectam gratiam 
florentissimi hominis effunderem a meque ipse deficerem et, quod initio 
semperque fugi, civili bello interessem.   
 
...so that you would think me either so thoughtless as to withdraw from the 
awakened fortune for the fortune that is in decline and nearly is dead; or so 
inconsistent as to throw out the acquired favor of a singularly flourishing person, 
to forsake myself, and to participate in a civil war, that I have avoided continually 
from the beginning.
 55   
 
Cicero could see his options logically and know that Caesar, in the long run, was a better choice 
for victory, but also knew this choice to be less morally sound.  
 
In August of 47, after Caesar 
had defeated Pompey and was mopping up throughout the Mediterranean, Cicero writes to 
Cassius, saying of the republic, “ego autem ex interitu eius nullam spem scilicet mihi 
proponebam, ex reliqui<i>s magnam.” (“But for my part I imagined of course no hope from its 
[the republic’s] ruin but from its remains great hope.”)56  By 47, though skeptical, Cicero can 
perhaps see some kind of benefit for the fall of the republic, and by June of 46 Cicero seems to 
be in Caesar’s camp, writing to Varro:  
non enim est idem ferre si quid ferendum est et probare si quid non probandum 
est.  Etsi <ne> quid non probem quidem iam scio, praeter initia rerum ; nam haec 
in voluntate fuerunt.  Vidi enim (nam tu aberas) nostros amicos cupere bellum, 
hunc autem non tam cupere quam non timere.57    
 
For it is not the same to endure what must be endured and to approve what must 
not be approved.  Yet now I don’t even know what I should not approve, except 
the beginnings of the events [the civil war]; for these things were voluntary.  For I 
saw (since you were away) that our friends desired war, but this fellow did not so 
much desire war as not fear it. 
 
In this letter, Cicero goes on to express disappointment in his own camp.  The republicans were 
just as prone to violence and excess as Caesar’s side.  This sentiment explains what he means by 
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implying that his friends were too eager for war, while Caesar was ready for war if it came.  
Shackleton  Bailey goes even further, saying that Caesar could not even be held solely 
responsible for the war and that he had no real choice in the following events.
58
   
 In the same letter to Varro, Cicero goes on to say that he only supported the republicans 
for the cause and not for Pompey as leader, saying, “nunc vero, si essent nostri potiti, valde 
intemperantes fuissent.” (“But now if our side had got control, they would have been very 
unrestrained.”)59  He sees the outcome with Pompey as leader negatively as well.  But by mid-
July a letter to Papirius Paetus shows a great deal of doubt and resentment in Cicero’s mind, 
calling Caesar “omnis potestas” (“all powerful”).  This remark, coupled with Cicero’s 
observation that Caesar is becoming more powerful, indicates that if Cicero wants to speak out 
against Caesar in any way, he will have to be subtle. He mentions how many wise men lived 
under tyrants in Athens and Syracuse  and maintained their freedom, and therefore Cicero should 
be able to as well.60   He is aware of how volatile the future could be and he is aware that he must 
be careful to stay in Caesar’s good graces.  Cicero’s relationship with Caesar was undoubtedly 
politically motivated.  Caesar was the “All Powerful,” and Cicero would have been foolish not to 
attempt to curry favor with him.   
 Until this point, Cicero had been warily optimistic of Caesar’s rule.  In mid-October of 
46, Cicero indicates an important point, namely the clemency that Caesar showed to Marcellus, a 
man who had opposed Caesar for years.
61
  Cicero says to Servius Sulpicius Rufus, “ita mihi 
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pulcher hic dies visus est ut speciem aliquam viderer videre quasi reviviscentis rei publicae” 
(“This day seemed so beautiful to me that I seemed to see some semblance of a virtually reviving 
republic.”)62  From this point, Cicero accepts the possibility of postponing his literary pursuits for 
a partial return to politics, as he believed that Caesar might establish a constitutional government. 
Yet this letter is full of contradictory statements.  Early in the letter he says, “...tu quid doleat 
scribere audes, nos ne id quidem tuto possumus” (“you dare to write what is painful, we [I] 
indeed cannot do even that with safety”).  He lives in an environment where they are too afraid 
to speak freely, yet Cicero ends this thought saying, “nec id victoris vitio, quo nihil moderatius, 
sed ipsius victoriae” (“Nor is it the fault of the victor, than whom nothing could be more than 
moderate, but of the victory itself”).  This is a strange juxtaposition.  Cicero is not safe to write 
his true sentiments (which, ironically, he writes) but follows this by absolving Caesar.  It is 
certainly possible that Cicero included the latter section in case the letter was intercepted, but if 
he thought the letter would be disseminated, it is doubtful that he would have included his exact 
fear.  Similarly, Cicero says that they must do only what they believe Caesar wants (“nihil ut 
faciamus nisi quod maxime Caesar velle videatur” “That we do nothing except what in particular 
Caesar seems to want”), then later says that Caesar is the best thing about the situation in Rome 
(“...nihil melius ipso est…” “nothing is better than the man himself”).63   Exactly what Cicero is 
trying to express is difficult to discover.
64
       
This does not mean that Cicero is entirely happy.  Writing to P. Figulus in ad Fam IV.13, 
dated around August of 46, Cicero reveals that alongside Rome’s political turmoil, he is 
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experiencing a kind of survivor’s guilt despite--or perhaps because of--Caesar’s willingness to 
help him.   
tamen nihil iis conficior curis ut ipsum quod maneam in vita peccare me 
existimin.  careo enim cum familiarissimis multis, quos aut mors eripuit nobis aut 
distraxit fuga, tum omnibus amicis quorum benevolentiam nobis conciliarat per 
me quondam te socio defensa res publica, versorque in eorum naufragiis et 
bonorum direptionibus
65
 nec audio solum, quod ipsum esset miserum, sed etiam 
id ipsum video, quo nihil est acerbius, eorum fortunas dissipari quibus nos olim 
adiutoribus illud incendium exstinximus; et in qua urbe modo gratia, auctoritate, 
gloria floruimus in ea nunc his quidem omnibus caremus.
66
  
 
Nevertheless I am in no way consumed by those cares so that I think I myself am 
doing wrong because I remain alive.  For I am deprived  both of many intimates, 
whom either death has snatched from me or flight has pulled to different places, 
and of all the friends whose good will the defense of the republic had once united 
to our cause through me with you as my associate.  I live amid their shipwrecked 
lives and stolen goods.  I not only hear, which would be miserable in itself, but I 
also see the very fact (than which nothing is more bitter) that the fortunes are 
being scattered of those men with whose help in times past we put out that well 
known fire: in that city, in which I just recently flourished in esteem, influence, 
and glory, I now am deprived in fact of all these things.          
 
Cicero is aware that he was exceedingly fortunate and likely (though perhaps begrudgingly) was 
thankful to Caesar, and yet he felt some kind of pull from his previous allies.  
 By the end of 46 however, Cicero’s affection, if that’s what it was, for Caesar was 
beginning to fade; he writes to A. Torquatus “tamen mihi dubium non est quin hoc tempore bono 
viro Romae esse miserrimum sit.” (“Yet I have no doubt that at this time it is most wretched for a 
good man [“bono viro”] to be at Rome.”)67 Rome was no longer the place for Cicero, a bonus vir, 
to be.   He had realized that Caesar was not going to institute a republic and wanted no part of 
Rome. Previously, in October, 46, though there was no hope of reestablishing a republican 
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constitution, Cicero was confident in his own safety, though not the safety of Rome.68  By 
August of 45 Cicero has completely abandoned any support for Caesar, referring to his "royal" 
shows (“munerum regiorum”) and warning other people, in this case D. Brutus and Cassius, to 
stay away from Rome.
69
  In a letter written to Cassius on the Nones of May, 44, only a few 
weeks after Caesar’s assassination, Cicero states, “manabat enim illud malum urbanum et ita 
corroboratur cottidie ut ego quidem et urbi et otio diffiderem urbano.” (“For that well known evil 
in the city used to trickle and is now getting so strong each day that I indeed despaired both for 
the city and for peace in the city.”)70  In these letters, Caesar goes from a hawk, to a dove, to a 
cancer spreading throughout Rome and therefore throughout the empire.   
 
ad Atticum 
 Though not as difficult as the letters in ad Quintum fratrem, those in ad Familiares do 
present their own problems.  Cicero sent these letters to a number of people with varying levels 
of trust—he had no way to know whether his letters would remain confidential, so he had to 
operate coyly and carefully.  Whether they would be intercepted is another matter entirely.  With 
ad Atticum, this guardedness is less of a problem.  Cicero and Atticus had been close friends for 
decades by the time the civil war occurred, so the problems of privacy and sincerity in ad 
Familiares and ad Quintum fratrem are mostly absent from this collection of letters.  The two 
wrote to one another often, sometimes daily, and their discourse runs from 68 to late 44, 
providing an ongoing narrative of the events of Rome for over two decades. While Cicero does 
employ some basic tools to remain enigmatic (using Greek phrases, thinly veiled nicknames, and 
so on), the epistulae ad Atticum reveals the most candid portrayal of Cicero.  For instance, 
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Cicero was distraught when his daughter Tullia died, but his depression reveals itself more in ad 
Atticum than in any other letters.  Thus, greater weight accrues to his opinions and words in these 
letters than any others.   
 The formal amicitia that existed between Caesar and Cicero while the former was in Gaul 
has already been discussed, and Cicero’s letters to Atticus contain evidence of the same, so I will 
examine this collection beginning at the turbulent time immediately prior to the civil war.  In his 
letter to Atticus of October 16, 50, Cicero expresses his dilemma regarding which party to 
support in an electoral conflict.  The conflict is not the war itself, but whether to allow Caesar to 
run for consul in absentia and keep his legions in Gaul, and it appears merely as a simple 
senatorial debate.  As Cicero notes, both Pompey and Caesar believed him to be on their side, 
and even to Atticus Cicero gives little indication as to whom he would support.  The only hint is 
when he discusses what would happen if the dispute came to war: “video cum altero vinci satius 
esse quam cum altero vincere.” ("I see it is preferable to be conquered along with the one than to 
win with the other.”)71  Cicero preferred a Pompeian victory.  Cicero managed to avoid this 
debate in the senate by waiting outside the gates of Rome for his own triumph that would never 
come.  While he was certainly disappointed by his inability to celebrate a triumph, he was 
apparently grateful to miss the senate debate. 
        In the ensuing months, Cicero complained about the faults of both Pompey and Caesar, 
saying for instance that Caesar had not treated him kindly enough, or blaming Pompey for giving 
Caesar additional legions and therefore making him stronger.72  As the letters continue, it is 
nearly impossible to identify a side that Cicero was convinced was absolutely the correct one.  
One letter, written in Athens in October, 50, laments that if the conflict comes to war, whoever 
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won would turn the republic into a tyranny.73  Cicero pleaded for peace because peace was the 
best choice, though, according to him, no one had been listening to his entreaties.74  He remained 
indecisive even after Caesar had crossed the Rubicon and Pompey had abandoned Rome and fled 
to southern Italy.  He tells Atticus in a letter from February 8, 49, that Caesar continued to ask 
Cicero to maintain his neutrality and expressed his satisfaction with what Cicero had been doing. 
Cicero was at somewhat of a loss because he had been excluded from so much planning on the 
republican side.75 
 Cicero remained neutral for a number of months, partially because he was torn by his 
loyalty to Pompey and his amicitia with Caesar.  In mid-February of 49, Cicero wrote rather 
indignantly that “qui, cum omnes Caesarem metuebamus, ipse eum diligebat; postquam ipse 
metuere coepit, putat omnis hostis illi esse oportere” (“This man himself [Pompey] loved him 
when we all feared Caesar; after he himself  began to be afraid, he deems it necessary for all of 
us to be public enemies [“hostes”] to that man.”)76  Here Cicero complains about the lack of 
planning on Pompey’s side and about Pompey seeking a safe haven.  Yet on February 17 of 49 
Cicero joined Pompey, though he explains to Atticus that he is joining him only to work towards 
peace, not to help in war.77 Cicero finishes his letter asking “...si de bello, quid ego?” (“..if war, 
what will I do?”) which Shackleton  Bailey understands to mean that if there is a war, Cicero 
does not believe that he belongs in the military camp.
78
 As time passes, Cicero becomes 
decidedly more negative towards Caesar.  He bemoaned Caesar’s popularity because of his 
clemency while the masses hated Pompey even though, according to Cicero, he was fighting the 
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just cause.79  Cicero recognized the brilliance of Caesar’s strategy, though.  On March 1, 49, 
Cicero wrote a letter in which he again relates his sentiments, describing Caesar in these words, 
“sed videsne in quem hominem inciderit res publica? quam acutum, quam vigilantem, quam 
paratum?” (“But do you see to what kind of man the republic has fallen?  How sharp, how 
vigilant, how prepared?”)80  Cicero was not blinded by hatred or anger.  He acknowledged 
Caesar’s genius at gaining favor, and Pompey’s fumbling of the entire civil war.  Even more 
harshly, he said of Pompey on March 4, 49, “quem ego hominem  omnium iam 
ante cognoram, nunc vero etiam . non me igitur is ducit sed sermo 
hominum qui ad me <a> Philotimo scribitur; is enim me ab optimatibus ait conscindi.” (“This 
man I long ago had recognized as ‘most unpolitical’ of all, but now I recognize him also as most 
‘ungeneral-like’.  Therefore he does not lead me, but the talk of people that is described to me by 
Philotimus does lead me.  For he says that I am being cut to pieces by the optimates.”)81 At this 
point his concern is not for Pompey, not even for the republican cause, but for his own reputation 
among his peers.   
 Throughout Cicero’s inner debate on whether to join with Pompey or to stay in Rome, 
Cicero and Caesar were writing one another letters, though the tone was no doubt less friendly 
than the letters we examined in ad Quintum fratrem.82  Eventually, the two men met at Cicero’s 
villa in Formiae on March 28, 49.  The letter of that date opens with Cicero crowing that he 
spoke respectfully but honestly, and that Caesar was probably not pleased with him.  Cicero 
details the conversation: 
damnari se nostro iudicio, tardiores fore reliquos, si nos non venerimus, dicere. 
ego dissimilem illorum esse causam. Cum multa, 'veni igitur et age de pace.' 
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'meone ' inquam 'arbitratu?' 'an tibi' inquit 'ego praescribam?' 'sic' inquam 'agam, 
senatui non placere in Hispanias iri nec exercitus in Graeciam transportari, 
multaque , inquam 'de Gnaeo deplorabo.' tum ille, 'ego vero ista dici nolo.' 'ita 
putabam , inquam; 'sed ego eo nolo adesse quod aut sic mihi dicendum est 
multaque quae nullo modo possem silere si adessem aut non veniendum.' summa 
fuit, ut ille quasi exitum quaerens, 'ut deliberarem.' non fuit negandum. ita 
discessimus.83 
 
If we do not come, he said that he was damned by my decision, that the others 
would be slower [in joining him].  I said the cause was different for those men.  
After much talk he said ‘Then come and talk about peace.’ I replied ‘On my own 
terms?’ ‘Would I prescribe to you?’ he asked. I said, “Then I will talk this way: 
that it does not please the senate for you to go to Spain, nor for the armies to be 
transported to Greece; and I will lament many things regarding Gnaeus.’  Then he 
replied ‘I really do not want these ideas of yours to be said.’  ‘I suspected that.’ I 
said. ‘But I do not want to be there, for the reason that I either must say them and 
many things which I can in no way keep silent about if I were there, or else I must 
not come.’ The chief point was that he asked as a virtual escape  ‘That I consider 
it’.  I did not have to refuse. So we parted.     
 
A number of points can be discerned from this letter.  First, Cicero was certainly not afraid of 
Caesar.  Though he was polite and respectful, he was also honest and true to his principles (this 
kind of political behavior is the basis of the institution of amicitia).  Second, for Cicero to tell a 
man as powerful as Caesar that he would openly defy him in the senate, there must be a level of 
mutual respect built into that amicitia.  Caesar still respected Cicero, and vice versa, as indicated 
by their meeting in person and Cicero’s speaking his mind.  Third, Cicero was concerned about 
upsetting Caesar in the senate.  Cicero spoke with Caesar in private with no repercussions, but 
knew that if he said the same thing in the senate, Caesar would probably take retribution.  This 
letter is invaluable.  It shows that even at this tumultuous time, there was still some kind of 
formal amicitia between the two, enough so that Cicero felt safe in refusing Caesar.   
 That interview was a dividing line in Cicero and Caesar’s amicitia.  Only a few weeks 
later, Cicero recognized Caesar as “tyrannus” and later stated that he was only being forgiving to 
                                                 
83
 ad Att. IX.18 
 35 
 
win favor with the people.84 Despite his anger with Caesar,  Cicero still saw a victory by Pompey 
to be similar to a victory by Sulla, rife with proscriptions and tyrannical rule, but as a letter 
written May 2, 49, predicted, this outcome would be better than what would occur if Caesar were 
to win: “nam caedem video si vicerit et impetum in privatorum pecunias et exsulum reditum et 
tabulas novas et turpissimorum honores et regnum non modo Romano homini sed ne Persae 
quidem cuiquam tolerabile”  (“For I see gore if he wins, and an attack on private money and the 
return of the exiles, and new laws, and offices for the most shameful, and a monarchy bearable 
neither for a Roman nor even for any Persian.”)85  As time passed, communication between 
Caesar and Cicero continued to deteriorate.  Caelius, a supporter of Caesar and friend to Cicero, 
warned Cicero on April 16, 49 that if he did not stay neutral, Caesar’s policy of clemency would 
not hold for him, and that he would endanger his life.86  In a conversation that Cicero mentions in 
a letter dated May 19, 49, Balbus, another strong supporter of Caesar, told Atticus that Caesar 
was angry with Cicero (at the time Cicero was traveling to Greece to join Pompey’s camp).87  
This letter is Cicero’s last to Atticus regarding Caesar or the war until he returned to Rome after 
Pharsalus.  The few intermediary letters all say that the courier delivering the letter will tell 
Atticus about the state of the army.  There is only silence on Caesar until Cicero returns to 
Brundisium on November 4, 48.   
 The divide between Cicero and Caesar before Pharsalus was apparently bridged by the 
time that Cicero returned to Italy (that he was allowed to return to Italy is proof).  Cicero wrote 
to Atticus that Balbus and Oppius had promised to support Cicero in his efforts to return to 
Rome, and that Caesar would oblige, saying that “Caesari non modo de conservanda sed etiam 
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de augenda mea dignitate curae fore.” (“Caesar’s concern will be not only about maintaining my 
reputation (dignitas), but also about increasing it.”)88  The question here is Caesar’s motivation.  
Caesar’s decision reflected his general policy of clementia, but it also provided a basis on which 
to build their amicitia.  Cicero was an optimate and a highly respected member of the senate 
where he was known for his uprightness and commitment to justice, which would help validate 
Caesar if Cicero supported him.  Caesar’s eagerness to grant Cicero clemency owed something 
to their previous working relationship under amicitia.  With the civil war virtually over (Caesar 
could not have known about the revolts in Spain), the political matters that separated the two 
were no longer relevant in the same way they had been, and the time was right to restore some 
semblance of their formal amicitia, even if Cicero was opposed to Caesar's new government.  
Cicero’s letters reveal only his hopes for Caesar’s clementia.  In fact, the next few years of letters 
give very little information regarding Caesar or his policies.  A letter from August 15, 47 shows 
Cicero doubting Caesar’s commitment to clemency, and notes that just as he can grant clementia, 
he can take it away as well.89   
From 47 to 45, there is a distinct lack of letters relating to Caesar, and those that do 
mention him are particularly blasé and do not provide any insight into their amicitia.  A letter 
written on September 1, 47 tells of Caesar’s plan to visit Cicero, but Cicero offers no opinion and 
only asks Atticus how he should handle the situation.
90
  Another discusses how best Cicero 
should settle his outstanding debt to Caesar.91  Neither of these letters expresses any opinions 
about Caesar.  They simply indicate that he exists and has dealings with Cicero (though his 
desire to get out of debt to Caesar is interesting to note).  There are perhaps several reasons for 
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this lapse.  The most obvious explanation is that Cicero's liberty depended upon his silence on 
the subject of Caesar.  Caesar did not spare him unconditionally, but rather with the 
understanding that if his taking up arms at Pharsalus was to be spared, the price was an absence 
of criticism. Another explanation is that Cicero did not want to write down anything that would 
be offensive to Caesar in case it was intercepted or reported.  While there was a drought of letters 
about Caesar from 47 onwards, Cicero begins criticizing Caesar in the spring of 45.  There is the 
unlikely possibility that Cicero found nothing to complain about or praise in this period.  Cicero, 
known for his witticisms, would surely have found something to complain about or praise.  The 
topic of Caesar may have been a sensitive issue between Cicero and Atticus.  As we will see in 
the pro Marcello and pro Ligario, in 46 Cicero enthused over Caesar’s potential to restore the 
republic.  But like Cicero during the war, Atticus was a Pompeian and may have avoided talk of 
Caesar for his own political reasons, which might have created tension between the two as 
Cicero tried to steer his own political course.  I find this a compelling and interesting point of 
view, though there is no evidence to refute or support it. 
By May of 45 Cicero returned to abusing Caesar, though this was not his primary purpose 
for writing.  In February of that year Cicero’s daughter Tullia had died and her passing 
devastated her father.  Many of his letters to Atticus in 45 deal with Tullia’s death.  In March of 
the same year Cicero reveals his sense of devastation about both his daughter’s death and the 
republic, “quid ipsa domo mihi opus est carenti foro?  occidimus, occidimus, Attice, iam pridem 
nos quidem, sed nunc fatemur, postea quam unum quo tenebamur amisimus. itaque solitudines 
sequor.”92  (“What need have I of my very house, if I lose the forum? I am ruined, I am ruined, 
Atticus, I have long been ruined in fact but now I admit it after I have lost the one thing by which 
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I was held together.  And so I pursue isolation.”) 93 He is distraught because of the death of his 
daughter, but perhaps for the death of the republic as well, so he avoids the forum and politics in 
general, as he sees no reason to continue going on.94  In another letter he further laments the state 
of the government: “fuit meum95 quidem iam pridem rem publicam lugere, quod faciebam, sed 
mitius; erat enim ubi acquiescerem, nunc plane non ego victum nec vitam illam colere possum, 
nec in ea re quid <aliis> videatur mihi puto curandum; mea mihi conscientia pluris est quam 
omnium sermo.”96  (“Indeed it has long been my role to grieve for the state, which I was doing, 
but rather mildly.  For it was where I might find comfort.  Now I clearly cannot cultivate either 
nourishment or life nor do I think I should take care of what seems good in that arena; my 
conscience is of more value to me than the gossip of all.”) The death of Tullia aggravated Cicero 
and at the same time he could not tolerate supporting a state which he could not morally abide.  
This appears to be the moment when Cicero fully accepts that Caesar is beyond reach and that 
there is no chance for anyone to revive the republic.  Cicero is experiencing his darkest period 
here, and that he was hopelessly despondent over the state should be no surprise.  There is, 
however, an important distinction to recognize.  Though Cicero is no longer willing to work with 
Caesar politically, they still seem to have some degree of amicitia, though perhaps no more than 
ordinary courtesy.  For instance, in August of 45 Caesar sent Cicero a letter discussing and 
praising many aspects of Cicero’s Cato.97  Similarly, Cicero read Caesar’s Anti-Cato and praised 
it himself.98  Outside of politics, they could write on opposite sides of the same topic and be able 
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to congratulate one another on well-written work. 
While Cicero may have spoken well of Caesar’s literary work, he did not approve of 
Caesar’s government.  There is a saga in Cicero’s letters of 45 regarding a certain “letter of 
advice” () that seems to be a letter in which Cicero would have advised Caesar 
on political affairs. 99  Cicero first mentions this letter on May 9, 45.  The contents of the 
proposed letter of advice are still a mystery, as Cicero never sent it to Caesar or talked about it 
explicitly, nor were drafts published in these collections.  But a good deal can be pieced together 
from information surrounding it, which then tells us more about Caesar and Cicero’s amicitia.  In 
this letter Cicero mentions that he is using Aristotle’s and Theopompus’ letters to Alexander but 
finds them useless because they were meant to praise Alexander.100  It can be inferred then, that 
his advice to Caesar was meant to be useful but not adulatory.  On May 20 both Atticus and 
Cicero himself think he should send the letter as a good citizen, but that first Balbus and Oppius 
should read it to approve of it, since they are close to Caesar and Atticus and could act as 
intermediaries.101  The letter, then, must be phrased correctly so as not to offend or upset Caesar.  
On May 25 Cicero writes that he received the advice from Balbus and Oppius and that since they 
offered so many changes Cicero decided not to send it at all: “ubi enim  magnum 
nullum fieri possit, ἀvel non magnum molestum futurum sit.”102 (“In fact, when no 
great ‘victory’ can be done, then ‘defeat’ will be no great trouble.”)  Finally, on May 28th, 
Cicero discusses Caesar’s plan to go to Parthia when things are resolved in Rome, as Cicero said 
he would have suggested to Caesar.103  Cicero would have offered political advice to Caesar but 
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did not want to appear disloyal or raise Caesar’s ire.  He would have advised Caesar to first 
resolve the problems in Rome.  The letter of advice was probably dangerous though Cicero 
believed he might get away with it because of their amicitia.  Indeed, on May 28, 45 Cicero also 
remarks that Caesar could do whatever he wanted about Rome and Parthia and still claim he was 
acting on Cicero’s advice.  This hyperbole exaggerates of course, but another letter may also 
suggest that Cicero still has a public role to play.
104
  Simultaneously, disparaging remarks about 
Caesar begin to fill the letters, saying that he is too big for Rome, or that Brutus told him Caesar 
had joined the honest men.
105
  
Cicero’s conflicted amicitia reveals itself in a letter dated December 19, 45.  Caesar and 
two thousand soldiers stopped at Cicero’s house for dinner.  This would be a terrible imposition 
to put on anyone, but Cicero only had pleasant things to say about the event.  Cicero opens the 
letter ironically, saying, “O hospitem mihi tam gravem ! fuit enim periucunde!” 
(“A guest so burdensome was ‘unregrettable’ for me!  For it was quite delightful!”)  Describing 
the meal and the events thereafter, Cicero said, “homines visi sumus. hospes tamen non is quoi 
diceres, 'amabo te, eodem ad me cum revertere.' semel satis est.  in sermone 
 multa. Delectatus est et libenter fuit.” (“We appeared as  real gentlemen. 
 Nevertheless my guest is not the type of person to whom you would say ‘please, come to me 
again’ Once is enough. In our conversation there was ‘nothing serious’ but much ‘that was 
literary.’  He was delighted and it was pleasing.”)106  This letter reveals that while Cicero could 
bear Caesar’s superficial company, he still did not want to be near him.  Furthermore, it shows 
that the two could still meet and be congenial, as long as the conversation did not veer towards 
politics, as both parties appear to have been aware.     
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This was the last letter that Cicero wrote regarding Caesar while the dictator was alive.  
As a whole, Cicero’s letters reveal a man whose formal amicitia was precarious because of the 
general political environment.  Cicero remained politically embittered and angry towards him in 
the remaining years, but Cicero’s letters show that while he rejected Caesar’s politics he could 
still discuss literary matters within the bounds of civility.  After Caesar’s assassination, Cicero 
quoted Gaius Mattius to Atticus on April 7: “nihil perditius; explicari rem non posse. 'etenim si 
ille tali ingenio exitum non reperiebat, quis nunc reperiet?' quid quaeris?’ perisse omnia aiebat 
(quod haud scio an ita sit; verum ille gaudens)” (‘Nothing more depraved; [he said] the problem 
cannot be untangled. ‘Indeed if with such ability that man [Caesar] could not discover a way out, 
who will find one now? What are you looking for?’ He said all [hopes] have perished (I really 
don’t know whether this could be so; but he was rejoicing”)107  Cicero recognized Caesar’s 
abilities, and seems to have understood that even with Caesar gone, republican Rome would 
never recover.  Cicero could still manage to socialize with the man, but he despised Caesar’s 
politics.  The veneer of amicitia continued to work even when the underlying reason for it was 
gone
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Chapter 2: Cicero’s Caesarian Speeches 
 
 
Cicero’s Rhetorical Background 
 
The previous chapter analyzed Cicero’s private letters in the hope of discerning Cicero’s 
attitude regarding Caesar.  Without probing his personal letters more in depth and in different 
ways, it would be impossible to know his deeper private thoughts.  I laid a foundation for 
understanding the evolution of Cicero’s attitudes towards Caesar based on his letters which 
reveal the vicissitudes of his relationship with Caesar.  But his public works will show how 
Cicero acted in front of large audiences to appease Caesar.  After Pharsalus in 48and Cicero’s 
subsequent return to Rome, the orator thought himself to be retired from politics.  He retreated 
into his philosophical discourses and remained absent from the forum.  With Caesar as dictator, 
there was very little room for political debate.  Yet in 46, only two years after Caesar’s victory 
over Pompey, Cicero returned to the stage in which he had gained his great fame and political 
notoriety.  Cicero would deliver three speeches, pro Marcello, pro Ligario, and pro Rege 
Deiotaro, all of which supported the end of exile for the three men that he defended, all of whom 
fought against Caesar in some way in the past.  While topically the speeches are similar, each 
speech possesses its own subtle nuances that shed a great deal of light on Cicero’s attitude 
toward Caesar at the time. These are the last public speeches (pro Rege was given in Caesar’s 
home in a private audience, so whether it was truly public is debatable) that Cicero gives during 
Caesar’s rule until Caesar’s death in 44 when he delivered the Philippica against Marcus 
Antonius.  It is important to keep in mind when analyzing these three speeches that Caesar ruled 
for another two years, and it is possible for Cicero to have altered his opinion of the man in this 
period, especially as it became more certain that Caesar had no intention of restoring a republic 
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to Rome.  
In Rome speaking before a crowd was not simply a job, it was an art.  Modern politicians 
often blunder through their speeches or improvise their thoughts in attempts to appear clever and 
witty.  To Romans this approach to public speaking would be both foolhardy and amateurish.  
The Romans deemed public speaking to be one of the most important skills a man could possess, 
and the ability of the orator could significantly affect his political career.  This was true for any 
would-be politician at the time; even Caesar, who was deemed as second in oratory only to 
Cicero, began his career in the forum arguing cases, along with almost every other politician.  
But for novi homines like Cicero, who had little taste for military service, his ability to speak in 
the forum was his way of advancing.  Before beginning the analysis of Cicero’s Caesarian 
speeches then, it is important to understand the role that rhetoric played both in Cicero’s 
education, and in his own life, and that political speeches in Rome had a far greater significance 
than in the modern era.   Fortunately Cicero left a good deal of information regarding oratory and 
rhetoric in Roman society.    
We know little about Cicero’s childhood and upbringing, and what we do know comes 
from Cicero’s own letters and the biography of Plutarch.  According to Cicero, he was raised in 
an environment of intellectuals who emphasized the importance of education.  Cicero describes 
his father and paternal uncle as “prudentissimi viri” (“very wise men”) who frequently conversed 
with Lucius Crassus, one of the main speakers of Cicero’s de Oratore.108  While Cicero debated 
with himself whether a great orator came from talent or training, he apparently displayed a talent 
for oratory when he was just a child.  Plutarch tells us very little of the education of Cicero but 
shows that from his boyhood he was recognized as a prodigy, “   
” (“shining because of his natural talent and getting a 
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name and reputation among the boys…”).109  While this description could very well be true, 
there may be some hyperbole to Plutarch’s quotation, as it follows a passage in which Plutarch 
describes Cicero’s birth as painless, and reports a fortune teller who said that Cicero would 
perform great acts for Rome.  Nevertheless, what we do know of Cicero’s education points to his 
natural ability and the encouragement of his father for Cicero to train in the art of oratory in 
which he clearly excelled.
 As Rome had no formal education system, the training of an orator varied from pupil to 
pupil.  This is not to say that there were no similarities.  For the most part, the type of education 
that Cicero received was reserved for the elite members of society who could afford not to have 
their sons performing physical labor, probably because they owned slaves.  Not all slaves were 
used for physical labor however; many Romans tasked some slaves to teach the children of 
wealthy Romans the Greek language and Greek rhetorical techniques, since many of the slaves 
had come from Greek speaking areas.
110
   By the end of the Macedonian wars in the second 
century BC and in large part because of the Scipionic circle, the Romans were familiar with the 
Greek lifestyle and had already begun importing Greek language, rhetoric, and philosophy. By 
the time that Cicero was educated in the early first century BC, Latin rhetorical training was 
nascent and most serious orators would have learned by imitation in the forum, or if studying it 
as a discipline, through Greek models; Suetonius relates how Cicero was forbidden to attend a 
school teaching rhetoric in Latin, even though the popularity of these schools was increasing.
111
  
Besides these factors, any other commonalities in the education of students in Rome are obscure.   
 Fortunately Cicero was never shy in discussing himself, and because of that scholars 
know more about his education than that of other Romans at the time.  Cicero was skilled in his 
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knowledge of the law in Rome.  In de Legibus, he states, “Discebamus enim pueri duodecim ut 
Carmen necessarium, quas iam nemo discit” (“In fact from boyhood we used to learn the twelve 
tables as compulsory reading, which now no one learns”).112  While Cicero was versed in Roman 
law, there is little evidence to suggest that he or other orators frequently cited and used the law in 
their speeches.  Cicero himself states that most orators of the time did not know the law, and that 
this reason, more than their speaking style or any other factor, was why orators lost their legal 
cases.
113
  Additionally, as we will see from the pro Marcello, not all cases were strictly legal.  
Legal facts and technicalities were often secondary features in a speech.  The orator was more 
likely to use impassioned pleas or discuss his own excellent character and achievements than cite 
the legal issues on which the case centered.
114
   Cicero himself was even guilty of this practice.  
In his pro Archia, in which the citizenship of his client is called into question, he spends only 
two chapters out of thirty-two discussing the legality of Archias’s citizenship.115  The rest states 
the extent that Archias has contributed to the education of Cicero, and extolls the merits of a 
poet.  Yet Cicero does focus on law, and even quotes the law directly.  Plutarch also briefly 
mentions Cicero’s education in the law, stating,    
 
(“Spending time among politicians and leaders of the Senate around Mucius Scaevola, he 
benefited in gaining experience with the laws”).116  Cicero had some legal training, which 
Plutarch felt compelled to mention in his biography.   
 Another facet of Cicero’s education in rhetoric was to go to the forum daily to watch the 
best orators of his day speak in both prosecutions and defenses.  Cicero states that “reliqui qui 
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tum principes numerabantur in magistratibus erant cotidieque fere a nobis in contionibus 
audiebantur” (“I have relinquished those who at that time were esteemed first among the 
magistrates and were heard by me in the assemblies nearly every day”).117  A large part of his 
education was in observation.  But just as internships in the modern era create connections, his 
time in the forum allowed him to establish relationships with the politicians of the day through 
the system called tirocinium fori, which was a relationship between established speakers and 
young men in training.  Anthony Corbeil explains that in this relationship the elder statesmen 
were able to teach through mock trials and situations and judge the youths’ ability for 
themselves.  They would then promote their top students and help to propel their careers.
118
  For 
Cicero, this mentor was  Quintus Mucius Scaevola the augur.  Cicero says in the opening lines of 
de Amicitia that Scaevola taught him the laws of Rome and that he rarely left Scaevola’s side.119  
While Cicero received an excellent education in rhetoric, he was unlikely to have access to any 
rhetorical tricks or techniques that his peers, such as Julius Caesar, would not know.  This means 
that Cicero would have found it difficult to subtly insult Caesar in his speeches without him 
understanding.    
 Before moving onto the three speeches that Cicero delivered in front of Caesar it is 
important to examine some assumptions as to why Cicero gave these speeches.  Scholars have 
often looked upon Cicero’s Caesarian speeches as mere attempts to earn favor with Caesar after 
Cicero returned to Rome following the civil war.  This conclusion is logical, but it is also too 
simplistic.  Some very simple analysis of the characteristics of Caesar and the situation cast 
shades of doubt upon this theory.  Caesar was forgiving and conciliatory to his enemies; he 
                                                 
117
 Cic. Brut. 305.   
118
 Corbiel, 2007, 71.   
119
 Cic.,  de Amic., 1-3.   
 47 
 
spared entire legions and allowed them to join him in Spain.
120
  While he did execute some 
supporters of Pompey, many supporters, such as Cicero, were forgiven and invited back to Rome 
(what percentage of senators received this clemency is impossible to know).  If Caesar valued 
Cicero enough to give him clemency once, Caesar was unlikely to banish him for a few 
comments that irked him.  Caesar recalled Cicero for his usefulness.  Cicero could lend an air of 
credibility to Caesar’s rule and, if necessary, Cicero may have been willing to speak for Caesar.  
It was important for Caesar to stay on good terms with Cicero just as Cicero probably wanted 
Caesar to see him in a positive way.  Caesar would have to be pushed far to damage his 
relationship with Cicero.  Another problem was what kind of punishment Caesar would have 
doled out.  During the Catilinarian conspiracy, Caesar pleaded with the senate not to execute the 
guilty, but to put them under house arrest and give them a fair trial.  It is not impossible to think 
that this would be his opinion in the case of the Pompeians.  Regardless, before continuing onto 
the Caesarian speeches, it is important to establish whether Cicero was one to bow to the power 
of a dictator.  Fortunately Cicero delivered a speech during Sulla’s dictatorship that answers this 
question.    
Cicero was not afraid to challenge the desire of a dictator, which can be seen in one of 
Cicero’s first speeches, the pro Roscio Amerino of 80.  In this speech, Cicero defended Sextus 
Roscius, who was accused of patricide.  Cicero detailed the facts of this case in his speech and 
demonstrated that Roscius was innocent.  Sextus Roscius the younger was at the family’s farm in 
Ameria when his father, Sextus Roscius the elder, was in Rome at the time when he was 
murdered.  Sensing an opportunity for profit, Chrysogonus, a leading citizen in Rome, arranged 
for the elder Roscius to be placed on Sulla’s proscription lists post-mortem, despite Sulla having 
abandoned this practice.  Sulla then sold this farm to Chrysogonus for two thousand sesterces 
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even though it was believed to be worth approximately six million sesterces.  When Roscius had 
his farm taken away from him the people of Ameria were outraged.  They banded together to 
meet with Sulla but were blocked by Chrysogonus, who promised that he would speak to Sulla 
for them.  This did not happen.  Cicero attests that at this point Chrysogonus and his followers 
became nervous and decided that Roscius had to be eliminated.  Roscius hid, but was found, 
arrested, and put on trial for the capital charge of murder. 
 This was Cicero’s first major defense and despite Chrysogonus’s influence in Rome, the 
orator, who was young and hardly known in the forum, triumphed.  For any orator a victory in 
these circumstances would have brought fame and notoriety, but also danger because he was 
challenging the dictator Sulla. Cicero believed that the only reason he was able to defend Roscius 
was that the other speakers, apparently all of them, were too afraid of Chrysogonus, and more 
notably of his friend Sulla, whom the senate had appointed to the office of dictator without a 
term limit.  If Cicero were afraid of angering Sulla, as many propose he was of angering Caesar, 
this speech would logically anticipate the Caesarian speeches in Cicero’s praise for Sulla.121  Yet 
it does not.  This is not to say that Cicero brazenly attacked Sulla.  He says repeatedly throughout 
the speech, “Haec omnia, iudices, imprudente Lucius Sulla facta esse certo scio” (“I am certain, 
judges, that all of this happened without Lucius Sulla’s knowledge”).122  The frequency with 
which Cicero expresses this sentiment shows the reader that he was attempting to exculpate Sulla 
from any blame and save himself from the ire of Sulla.  Cicero still manages to drop thinly veiled 
insults and criticisms of Sulla however.  Early in the speech he remarks: 
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Ego si quid liberius dixero, vel occultum esse, propterea quod nondum ad rem 
publicam accessi, vel ignosci adulescentiae poterit; tametsi non modo ignoscendi 
ratio, verum etiam cognoscendi consuetudo iam de civitate sublata est.
123
 
 
If I speak too freely, either it can be covered, because I have not yet entered into 
public business, or my youth can be forgiven;  although not only the rationale of 
pardoning but even the habit of inquiring about the state has now been abolished.        
 
This passage is rife with potential problems for Cicero.  The opening line hints that 
Cicero dislikes Sulla’s regime and harbors discontent in his mind; he knew that if he voiced his 
opinions too often and too loudly, he might have a very short career indeed.  He continues to 
attack the regime, noting the current reduction of civil liberties in Rome.  Cicero peppers his 
speech with dissident comments, such as saying that those proscribed “qui adversarii fuisse 
putabantur” (“who were deemed to have been opponents”) belonged to Sulla’s opposition or that 
Sulla was incapable of knowing and controlling all that was occurring in Rome because he was 
not a god (insinuating that only gods could rule everything).
124
  The entire speech teems with 
Cicero’s feeling that Sulla and his companions are too powerful and too confident.  Cicero’s 
victory made him an immediate star, and the influx of work apparently wore him out.
125
  Soon 
afterward, he made a trip to Athens to recover his health.  According to Plutarch, Cicero went to 
Greece to flee Sulla, though he does admit that at the time Cicero was very thin, had a weak 
stomach, and his voice was becoming scratchy and high-pitched.
126
  For whatever reason he went 
to Greece, he was not afraid to make a dictator unhappy. If he could speak out when no one 
would miss him, then he very well could speak out when he was the preeminent orator in Rome. 
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pro Marcello 
 It is now time to turn to the Caesarian speeches and attempt to extract some indication of 
Cicero’s attitudes towards Caesar at the time.  In the recent decades little work has been done on 
these orations as a unit, the most in depth treatment of them being Harold Gotoff’s Cicero’s 
Caesarian Speeches.  While his rhetorical analysis is useful and laced with pertinent historical 
information, Gotoff’s purpose was to create a stylistic commentary, not an historical analysis.  
While Gotoff does not state openly whether or not he believes the pro Marcello (given in 46) or 
any other speech to be sincere, he does say, “a close reading of pro Marcello and the other 
Caesarianae reveal Cicero adopting attitudes that are anything but fawning and abject”.127  There 
is the possibility that Cicero’s views are not entirely sincere, but some scholars, such as R.R. 
Dyer, take this sentiment to the extreme.  Dyer believes all of pro Marcello is a veiled attack on 
Caesar.  According to Dyer, Cicero’s discussion of Caesar’s clemency is housed in the idea that 
the need to give clemency was all a result of Caesar’s civil war and his tyranny (Pompey and 
other senators are apparently blameless), and that Cicero’s goal was to create jealousy towards 
Caesar in the senate and rouse up opposition to him, perhaps even propose assassination.
128
  
While Dyer makes some interesting and accurate points, his greater argument is overly cynical 
and ignores the positive statements Cicero makes about Caesar in his personal letters.  
Furthermore, Michael Winterbottom points out that there is evidence within Cicero’s letters that 
he was pleased with Caesar at this point, although he concedes that Cicero was likely trying to 
make the best of a bad situation.
129
  There are further stylistic reasons to believe Cicero was 
sincere in his comments.  Michael von Albrecht identifies many aspects of this speech that occur 
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within epideictic speeches and that Cicero himself identifies within his own Orator.
130
  Thus, 
while Cicero may be sincere in his praise, it is likely that his sincerity is couched in an 
unhappiness about political affairs, but a recognition (and perhaps appreciation) that the situation 
could be even more dire.     
Marcus Claudius Marcellus began the cursus honorum (the series of offices a Roman 
politician had to hold to become consul) in 65, and reached the consulship in 51.  In these 
fourteen years, Marcellus never appeared to be a supporter of Caesar but did appear as a faithful 
ally of Cicero, even training as an orator under him.  Marcellus’s consulship came at a difficult 
time in Rome.  Caesar’s imperium in Gaul would end in 49, and even if Caesar were to be 
elected consul for 48, he would have had ten months in which he was vulnerable to prosecution 
by the senate.  While ten months was apparently too much for Caesar, it was too little for 
Marcellus.  In 51 he proposed that Caesar’s imperium in Gaul end prematurely, as Caesar had 
already attained victory and he was no longer needed to pacify the Gallic tribes.  He also 
opposed Caesar’s plan of running for consul in absentia, which would have granted him 
immunity from prosecution if elected.
131
  Marcellus was no supporter of Caesar.  
 Perhaps Marcellus’s persistent contempt is why Cicero was hopeful when Caesar yielded 
to the wishes of the senate to grant him clemency and end Marcellus’s exile from Rome; it 
showed that there was hope for a republic.  In a letter to Servius Sulpicius Rufus, Cicero states, 
“Noli quaerere: ita mihi pulcher hic dies visus est, ut speciem aliquam viderer videre quasi 
reviviscentis rei publicae” (“Do not ask.  Today seemed to me so beautiful that I seemed to be 
seeing some semblance of a virtually reviving republic”).132 He expresses no regret at his 
supposition and speaking in praise of Caesar, only that his speaking may have inadvertently 
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caused him to become a public figure once again and leave less time for his philosophica, yet he 
states that this occasion was so magnificent that he had to speak for Caesar.
133
  Cicero describes 
Caesar as magnanimous and is impressed with Caesar’s choices to be forgiving as a dictator; his 
praise was made to encourage the dictator to maintain his forgiving ways and not become the 
more severe tyrant that Romans feared. Still, Cicero is not completely content with the political 
situation in Rome.  He urges Rufus to stay away from Rome because of the political situation, 
though he adds that “Res sunt eiusmodi, ut, si Romae sis, nihil te praeter tuos delectare possit; de 
reliquis, nihil melius ipso est
134…” (“Matters are of such a kind that, if you should be in Rome, 
nothing could please you more except your own [friends and family].  Regarding the rest, 
nothing is better than the man [Caesar] himself”).135  Cicero dislikes the tyranny, but believes 
that Caesar may yet restore something of a republic to Rome.
136
   
As Gotoff notes, the pro Marcello is named poorly.
137
  By the time of the speech, 
Marcellus had already been granted clemency and no argument was needed on Cicero’s part.  
The purpose of the speech is to praise Caesar for his clemency and, I believe, it served as a 
public message from Cicero for Caesar to keep up the good work and restore the republic.
138
  
Though Cicero was hyperbolizing his praise, his sentiments were likely sincere because he also 
mentions events that would be awkward for Caesar and the present senators, “ipsam victoriam 
vicisse videris, cum ea, quae illa erat adepta, victis remisisti; nam cum ipsius victoriae 
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condicione omnes victi occidissemus, clementiae tuae iudicio conservati sumus” (you seem to 
have won the very victory, when you gave back to the conquered those things which it [the 
victory]  had obtained; for when by the condition of the very victory we all, having been 
conquered, would have been killed, we were saved by the policy of your clemency.”)139  In 
referring to the above passage, Krostenko highlights that “in structure almost all of the sentences 
seem to have been deliberately designed to heighten the appearance of paradox and contrast” to 
create a sense of Caesar’s strength of character.140 Cicero openly states that Caesar conquered 
them, a word choice that makes Caesar seem tyrannical and makes plain the political situation.  
Caesar’s power came from force and not the will of the people, but by giving the senate what 
they wanted, Caesar appears to be willing to listen to the senate and does not appear as a tyrant.  
Still, Cicero openly calls Caesar a tyrant but one who has the best interest of the people at heart.  
Cicero continues to make similar comments, stating that if Caesar’s opponents had not died in 
the civil war (that he caused) Caesar might have become friends with them, or that some people 
will still find fault with Caesar until he ends all the chaos that the civil war started.
141
  In keeping 
with this, Cicero says: 
  
Omnia sunt excitanda tibi, Gaius Caesar, uni, quae iacere sentis, belli ipsius impetu, quod 
necesse fuit, perculsa atque prostrata: constituenda iudicia, revocanda fides, 
comprimendae libidines, propaganda suboles, omnia, quae dilapsa iam diffluxerunt 
severis legibus vincienda sunt.
142
  
 
All the things that you perceive lying flat, smashed and strewn by the onset of the very 
war that was necessary, must be roused up by one man, you, Gaius Caesar; courts must 
be established, credibility must be recalled, licentiousness must be suppressed, offspring 
must be propagated, all these things that have now collapsed and gone away must be 
bound together by strict laws. 
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 Cicero boldly blames Caesar for the terrible state of Rome, but expresses confidence that 
a man as great as Caesar can (and will) fix these problems.  It should also be noted that Cicero 
places a good deal of pressure on Caesar here, and attempts to guide him regarding the correct 
path to fix the republic and win back the faith of the senate.  If Cicero’s goal was to subvert 
Caesar by veiled comments while superficially praising him, this would not be the best approach.  
Openly criticizing Caesar while simultaneously praising him creates an air of sincerity and 
allows Cicero to express his displeasure at the political situation while simultaneously expressing 
his confidence that Caesar is trying to help the people and restore a republic.   
Previous scholars, such as Gotoff and Dyer, have doubted Cicero’s sincerity in this 
speech, but a different reading reveals that while some of his comments may have been 
exaggerated, he not only praises Caesar but also offers sincere criticism.  Caesar is blamed for 
the civil war, impugned for killing other senators, and tasked with fixing the broken state of 
Rome.  If Cicero’s speech were cloyingly sweet then much of it would have been a veiled 
criticism of Caesar and his regime.  But Cicero introduces other elements in pro Marcello that 
grounds the oration in reality, and also strongly contrasts this speech with pro Roscio.  At this 
point Cicero could not have known that Caesar had no intention to restore the republic.  As far as 
Cicero knew, the clemency of Marcellus was a positive step toward attaining the restoration of 
the republican government that Cicero loved.  The pro Marcello was an opportunity to praise 
Caesar’s good deeds and subtly urge him to continue acting nobly and not as a dictator.           
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pro Ligario 
 While pro Marcello was not a traditional defense but a praise of Caesar’s clemency, pro 
Ligario (delivered in 46) sees Cicero returning to more familiar rhetorical purposes to convince 
Caesar to grant Ligarius clemency.  Some specifics about this case make it particularly 
interesting.  Pro Ligario is a judicial speech in which Cicero admits his client’s guilt quickly and 
uses the rest of the speech to plead to Caesar to grant Ligarius clemency.  Cicero was indeed 
beseeching Caesar for clemency because Caesar had begun to use his dictatorial powers.  In this 
particular case Caesar had the trial set in public in the forum. Christopher Craig, among other 
scholars, believes that Caesar did all of this to publicize his generosity and tendency to favor 
clemency.
143
  This is a likely scenario, especially in light of Plutarch’s anecdote in which Caesar 
is purported to have said,    
 (“What prevents [me] from hearing Cicero 
speaking at this time, since long ago the man [Ligarius] was judged as a criminal and public 
enemy”).144  If the public knew Caesar’s preconceptions about Ligarius, then his decision to 
acquit the defendant would seem even more merciful and extraordinary to Caesar’s audience, not 
to mention bolster Cicero’s reputation.
 The events leading to this speech once again center on opposition to Caesar during the 
civil war.  In his opening, Cicero explains the proceedings that led to Ligarius’s prosecution.  
Ligarius traveled to Africa as a legate for the governor Gaius Considius.  When the time came for 
consular election, Considius left Africa and during his absence put Ligarius in charge.  When the 
civil war broke out, Publius Attius Varus was sent out by Pompey to take control of the province, 
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which he did. Ligarius continued to serve under Varus and fought against Caesar at Thapsus, 
where Caesar captured him and subsequently released him into exile.  Cicero brushes over these 
details and states that no crime relevant to the case was committed in these events, since Ligarius 
had been given clemency for these actions.
145
  At this point information regarding the case 
becomes sparse because Cicero does not mention the charges presented against Ligarius by 
Quintus Aelius Tubero.  Fortunately Quintilian states that Tubero charged Ligarius with not 
merely remaining a Pompeian, but with defecting to Juba (the kind of Numidia) and the Africans 
who were enemies of Caesar and closely tied with the cause of Pompey.
146
  Thus, Ligarius was 
not put on trial for fighting against Caesar (for which Cicero was close to convincing Caesar to 
grant him clemency), but for allying himself against Rome, which all Pompeians did.
147
  In his 
opening remarks, Cicero admits Ligarius’s guilt and does not attempt to refute the claim.        
 Cicero’s argument throughout this speech is that Ligarius was only guilty of being in 
Africa and a supporter of Juba.  As Craig points out, this speech forces Cicero to balance the 
legality of the case with the mercy of Caesar.  Cicero knows that his client is guilty, and admits 
it.  Yet to have Ligarius acquitted and make the case more important, there must be some legal 
necessity since Ligarius’s joining with Juba puts him in a different situation than other 
Pompeians.  Caesar must adhere to existing laws while simultaneously delivering forgiveness, all 
while maintaining his dictatorial image.
148
  This precarious situation underscores that Cicero’s 
speech was propaganda, and suggests that Caesar and Cicero were using each other to some 
extent.
149
  Perhaps to divert attention from this working relationship, Cicero asserts that much of 
Caesar’s clemency is designed for him to simply look good to the Roman people and make his 
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tyranny seem less severe:  
si in hac tanta tua fortuna lenitas tanta non esset, quam tu per te, per te, inquam, 
obtines—intellego qui loquar—acerbissimo luctu redundaret ista victoria  
 
If in such great fortune as yours there were not such great leniency which you hold 
onto by yourself, by yourself, I say—I who am speaking understand—this victory 
of yours (ista) would overflow in a very sharp lamentation.
150
 
 
He states overtly that Caesar is pandering to the people, which most informed Romans probably 
knew.  But that Cicero willingly said it before Caesar in public helps to veil the connection of the 
two men.  He continues to criticize the clemency displayed by Caesar, since the Pompeians 
whom Caesar had exonerated were not criminals in the first place; Cicero even says that he does 
not think he is indebted to Caesar for his own life because he does not consider himself a 
criminal.
151
  Cicero’s attitude here creates an air of independence from Caesar, claiming that 
Cicero is still very much his own person and realistically owes nothing to Caesar.  Cicero ends 
the speech arguing that Caesar must show kindness towards Ligarius if he wishes to win the 
people over and make them happy, “Nihil est tam populare quam bonitas, nulla de virtutibus tuis 
plurimis nec admirabilior nec gratior misericordia est” 152 (“nothing is so popular as benevolence, 
not one of your many virtues is more admirable nor more pleasing than your mercy”).  By 
publicly identifying Caesar as trying to manipulate the minds of the people, the words of Cicero 
appear more sincere.  The goal is to convince the people that even if they cannot trust Caesar, 
they can trust Cicero, and that when Cicero praises Caesar, he is sincere in his praise.   
 Because of Cicero’s admission of his client’s guilt, and the public spectacle made from 
the whole trial, it seems that the verdict of the case was never in doubt.  Caesar acquitted 
Ligarius and allowed him to return from exile.  Ligarius was resentful, not grateful, that he even 
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had to be given clemency by a dictator.
153
  By allowing Ligarius to live, Caesar created and freed 
another enemy, who would later repay Caesar with a knife. 
 
pro Rege Deiotaro 
 Cicero delivered pro Marcello in front of the senate after Caesar had granted Marcellus 
clemency; he delivered pro Ligario in the forum with Caesar as sole judge, jury, and potential 
executioner.  Both men had been former supporters of Pompey and Caesar acquitted both.  
Cicero’s third Caesarian speech is drastically different from the others.  While Marcellus was a 
prominent Roman politician and Ligarius was a relative nobody, Deiotarus was the king of the 
client kingdom of Galatia.  This trial represented a particular challenge for Cicero.  As in the 
case of Ligarius, Caesar was again the sole judge.  Unlike the other speeches however, this 
oration was delivered in Caesar’s home with an extremely limited audience.154  Cicero hardly 
seems to take this oration seriously.  It is full of flippant wit and severe language for the 
prosecution, and of course praise for the judge.  Yet the praise is more restrained than previous 
compliments.  Cicero’s positive comments about Caesar are sparser, and any criticism of him is 
all but absent.  The change in tone of this speech from the previous two indicates Cicero’s 
dawning awareness of the inevitable fate of the res publica.  He may have understood that his 
pleading would be irrelevant, since whatever Caesar wanted to do, he would do.  There would be 
few people in attendance, so those absent might reasonably think that Cicero did not present a 
convincing argument.  Cerutti points out that in the pro Roscio Amerino Cicero states his doubt 
as to whether judicial process could occur under Sulla, and that nowhere is this expressed in pro 
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Rege, which Cicero delivered in the autumn of 45.
155
  I disagree with his conclusion that this was 
done because of Cicero’s faith in Caesar.  Rather, I think it is more accurate to state that by 
mentioning his trepidation in pro Roscio, he purposefully made fairness a point in the minds of 
his listeners.  With Caesar in his home and with few others in attendance, Cicero probably 
understood fairness was a moot point.  The setting of the speech alone was cause enough for 
Cicero to be suspicious; that the process was aimed at a king who by all indications was entirely 
innocent only bolstered this suspicion.   
 As with the other Caesarian speeches, Cicero was speaking on behalf of a former ally of 
Pompey, who had fought against Caesar at Pharsalus and retreated to Galatia after the battle.  
Deiotarus had been a strong ally of Rome throughout his rule of approximately forty years.  He 
had helped Pompey combat Mithridates (and was rewarded with land from Pontus) and had 
helped Cicero in his minor military campaigns (for which Cicero was hailed as imperator) while 
he was governor of Cilicia.  Naturally for a man so far removed from Rome and loyal to the 
status quo, Deiotarus decided it was best to side with Pompey.  Leaving Egypt, Caesar soon 
traveled to Galatia where Deiotarus entreated him for, and received, Caesar’s forgiveness, with 
slight subtractions from Deiotarus’s kingdom for his disloyalty.  According to the prosecutor 
Castor, Deiotarus’s grandson, it was Deiotarus’s plan to murder Caesar as he stayed in his palace 
but it was ultimately unsuccessful because of the luck that allegedly clung to Caesar throughout 
his life.  Cicero refutes this charge rather soundly.  This speech places Caesar in an 
uncomfortable position.  He is not dealing with a mere supporter of Pompey, or even a former 
consul, but a king.  If Caesar dismissed the charges, even if Cicero’s side of the events was 
accurate, Caesar may have appeared weak to other provincial leaders, and quickly found himself 
confronting a widespread revolt.  Conversely, if Caesar found Deiotarus guilty, he would appear 
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tyrannical and cause others either to fear him or to revolt.  Perhaps this was why Caesar chose to 
hear the speech in his own home with a limited audience.
156
  He would be able to decide the case 
without the public having knowledge of the arguments.  It is likely that Caesar would have been 
happier if he did not have to hear the case, but it was Caesar’s decision to allow the case to 
continue (again, perhaps because he felt concern about appearing weak).  It is no surprise then 
that Caesar forestalled his judgment.  Caesar had planned to go to war with Parthia and perhaps 
wanted Deiotarus to be a little nervous as he traveled east with several Roman legions.  The Ides 
of March came sooner than Caesar’s departure to Parthia, and thus Caesar’s verdict on the case 
will remain unknown. 
 The interpretation of pro Rege Deiotaro is more complex than the previous Caesarian 
speeches.  There is a change in tone, difficult to describe without reading the three speeches 
consecutively.  Pro Marcello praised Caesar almost excessively but also contained jabs at 
Caesar.  Pro Ligario appeared to be more of a precise dance between the two men, with Cicero 
walking a line between propaganda and reality.  The pro Rege Deiotaro lacks these distinct 
features. This is not to say that the speech is dull.  It is full of Cicero’s mocking wit to the 
grandson of Deiotarus and the runaway physician/slave who testifies against his former master.  
Throughout the speech, Cicero states that testimony from a slave is illegal, and asks, “Quae crux 
huic fugitivo potest satis supplicii adferre?” (“what cross can bring sufficient punishment to this 
fugitive slave?”).  He insults Castor as a bloodthirsty ambitious degenerate who simply could not 
wait for his turn on the throne.
 157
  Indeed, it is an entertaining speech but lacks the gravitas of 
his former speeches.  Perhaps Cicero finally began to realize both that Caesar was truly a dictator 
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and that his arguments would be inconsequential.  By the time that Cicero delivered this speech, 
the praise that he gave so enthusiastically a year before had faded; Cicero had sufficiently beaten 
the dead horse that was Caesar’s penchant for clemency.  The orator hardly praises Caesar for 
anything else in this speech, which reads as both unenthusiastic and repetitious. When Caesar is 
accused in a letter of being a tyrant because he erected a statue of himself with the kings of 
Rome, Cicero redirects the topic, saying, “Nam de statua quis queritur, una praesertim, cum tam 
multas videat?”(“for who laments about the statue, one in particular, when he sees so many?”). 
Instead of trying to defend the action, he simply states that it is one of many statues.
158
  This is a 
halfhearted defense by Cicero, especially since he had complained about either the same statue 
or a similar one to Atticus, stating, “De Caesare vicino scripersam ad te quia cognoram ex tuis 
litteris. Eum Quirino malo quam Saluti. (“About your neighbor Caesar, I wrote to you 
because I learned of it from your letter.  I prefer his “sharing a temple” with Quirinus rather than 
Salus.”)159 Shackleton Bailey explains this comment: “The Senate had voted to set up a statue of 
Caesar entitled ‘To the undefeated God’ in the temple of Quirinus (Romulus), which was near 
Atticus’ house.”160 Cicero can only muster these lame defenses of Caesar in his final Caesarian 
speech. 
 Because Cicero has a difficult time defending Caesar publicly (an obligation of formal 
amicitia), he becomes more comfortable at expressing his realization that Caesar was indeed a 
king or tyrant. Pro Rege contains several statements from Cicero that could easily be construed 
as calling Caesar a king, that is, a tyrant.  One of the first and more brazen statements Cicero 
makes is to praise Pompey in the house of Caesar.  Cicero celebrates Pompey as a hero of Rome 
who was famous for a whole list of virtuous traits.  Caesar was indeed forgiving and if accounts 
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are to be believed, Caesar was bereft at the death of Pompey.
161
  Yet to praise Caesar’s enemy in 
Caesar’s own home is a daring act.   Cicero also lists several traits of a king, “fortem, iustum, 
severum, gravem, magnanimum, largum, beneficum, liberalem: hae sunt regiae laudes” (“strong, 
just, strict, serious, generous, kind, liberal: these are the praises for a king”).162  These are all 
qualities for which Cicero also had praised Caesar in the previous speeches.  While defending 
Deiotarus, he further states that if Deiotarus had killed Caesar, he would have been acting like a 
tyrant because of this murderous impulse.
163
   Cicero is implying that if Caesar has Deiotarus 
executed, he will cross into the ranks of tyranny.  Cicero was no longer even a reluctant 
supporter of Caesar.   
In the late autumn or early winter of 45, Cicero, completely disenchanted with Caesar, 
knew that the man he hoped would restore the republic had instead established himself as tyrant.  
As we saw in the previous chapter, Cicero’s personal letters took a distinctly anti-Caesarian tone 
at this point.  These three speeches show the consequences of the same slow and steady change 
in Cicero’s perception of Caesar that also appeared in his letters.  While Cicero believed that 
Caesar might in fact restore some semblance of the republic, as time passed, Caesar’s heavy 
handedness was destroying his hope, and his disillusionment became a more and more frequent 
theme in his speeches.     
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Chapter 3: Catharsis, Caesar, and de Amicitia 
 
Both Romans and Greeks recognized the importance of amicitia (or ). Cicero, 
perhaps following the example of Aristotle, wrote his own treatise de Amicitia.  Historians such 
as Syme and Brunt have examined this work for Cicero’s interpretation of amicitia in a Roman 
context, but in this space I will explore selected ideas of Cicero’s as they apply to the amicitia 
between himself and Caesar.  De Amicitia suggests that Cicero, perhaps using his philosophica as 
a form of therapy, explained and organized his feelings on the death of Caesar. I believe that the 
downside of political amicitia with Caesar weighed heavily on his mind after the assassination.  
De Amicitia defines amicitia in many ways that could not apply to Caesar and Cicero.  In 
fact, de Amicitia idealizes the personal aspects of true amicitia and vitiates the claims of pure 
political amicitia of the type that Caesar and he had constructed.  Thousands of people had died 
in the civil war that brought Caesar to power, and the assassination of Caesar marked the 
ultimate failure of Rome’s political culture.  What is worse, with Caesar slain, civil war was 
again brewing with the potential loss of thousands more to bloodshed.  The political 
circumstances called into question the role of political amicitia in determining the overall course 
of events. Cicero, always the staunch supporter of the republic, was undoubtedly relieved at the 
removal of a tyrant.  Cicero was not obsessing over Caesar’s death, but was troubled by its 
violence and its meaning.  We can see that the amicitia between Cicero and Caesar, which has 
been established in the previous chapters, was contrary to Cicero’s idealized views of true and 
abiding amicitia.  For the purposes of this thesis, I examine and focus on only the selected 
psychological issues raised in this particular treatise as they bear on the working of political 
amicitia.  
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Like most philosophical dialogues, de Amicitia takes place as an imagined conversation, 
in this case between the statesmen Gaius Laelius, Quintus Mucius Scaevola, and Gaius Fannius. 
Though the latter two men are present in the conversation, most of the treatise is the monologue 
of Laelius, detailing his thoughts on his amicitia with Scipio Aemilianus, because it was the most 
famous (“familiaritatem fuisse”) of amicitiae.164 When Cicero begins to discuss what is 
necessary for amicitia, he states that true personal amicitia can only exist between good men 
(“boni viri”), whom he describes as “Qui ita se gerunt, ita vivunt, ut eorum probetur fides 
integritas aequitas liberalitas, nec sit in eis ulla cupiditas libido audacia, sintque magna 
Constantia.” (“They conduct themselves in such a way, they live in such a way, that their 
trustworthiness, integrity, and generosity may be demonstrated and that no avarice, lust, or 
recklessness may be in them, and that they may exist with great constancy.”)165  The good man 
has to be almost entirely selfless and rational and must not be a slave to his own urges, and this is 
the way optimates viewed themselves.  Even Cicero himself, a novus homo, displayed 
considerable ambition, and arguably may not have been the most sincerely loyal of men (recall 
his waxing and waning feelings for Pompey and Caesar at the beginning of the civil war). Cicero 
undoubtedly considered himself a good man however. He is famous for his pride and fancied 
himself the savior of the Republic; after his victory over Catiline in 63, he punctuates his 
speeches with this event, and within his de Domo sua he essentially claims that his return to 
Rome would bring stability to the city.  By definition as an optimate, he was a bonus vir.  It 
seems unlikely that he would consider Caesar a good man since his personal ambition and pride 
caused the death of thousands of Romans and led to a tyranny within Rome. Logically, if two 
good men are required for a true personal amicitia, then the amicitia between Cicero and Caesar 
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could only have been a pragmatic (political) relationship between one bonus vir and one purely 
politically motivated politician, exactly the type of relationship that Cicero distances himself 
from in de Amicitia.   
 Cicero notes that friends are likely to choose those who are similar to themselves in 
politics (though this is not indispensable), where they are from, and so on.
166
  Though Cicero did 
not note the habit of people in specific social classes sticking together, other Romans supported 
this concept.
167
  Cicero and Caesar were very different men with very different backgrounds and 
political views. Cicero was an eques and a plebeian, while Caesar was a nobilis from an 
aristocratic senatorial family and a patrician. Both orders, equestrian and senatorial, had wealthy 
members with political power. In general, equites were rich plebeians, but as a novus homo 
Cicero had to claw his way to the top of the political arena because he was looked down upon by 
the senatorial elite. Caesar was a patrician however and his family background provided more 
opportunity for a political career than Cicero’s. Politically, the two were also at opposite ends of 
the spectrum. Cicero believed in the strength of the republic and was a supporter of the 
optimates, while Caesar used the people to his advantage and saw the republic as an outdated 
system that was adequate for a city but not an empire. Political amicitia was possible as long as 
each gained from it. 
Cicero devotes a large amount of space to the idea of reciprocity in friendship, that is, 
what friends are supposed to do and feel for one another. This topic interested not only Cicero, 
but also modern sociologists and psychologists, who have discovered a good deal about the 
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societal expectations of “friendship” in the modern world.168 As stated in the introduction, 
scholars have long believed that amicitia in Rome was simply a political alliance, ignoring 
Cicero’s belief that, “Amor enim, ex quo amicitia nominata est, princeps est ad benevolentiam 
coniugendam” (“For love (amor), from which amicitia is named, exists first to join together good 
will (benevolentia).”)169 The speaker makes it clear, then, that before anything, amicitia must 
derive from a feeling of affection, which is impossible to prove between Caesar and Cicero.  
 But amor in Roman society is very different from “love” in our own. Amor is a much 
more pragmatic, utilitarian relationship.  It can involve something like what we call “love” but its 
primary function is to bind people together based on benevolentia, not on passion, intimacy, or 
congeniality. (Think of the public political role of a marriage like Pompey’s with Caesar’s 
daughter Julia or Marc Antony’s with Augustus’s sister Octavia.)  What I want to draw attention 
to here is not the origin of amicitia in amor, but that amor is based on benevolentia.  Nowhere is 
this connection more obvious than in political amicitia.  The two friends do not have to agree on 
everything, but the public positions they take on each other’s behalf have to be based on 
benevolentia; that is, the public position in support of a political friend has to be just that, 
supportive, and hopeful for the success of the other at least on the policy or issue in question.   
 Cicero presupposes that the two people who will become friends knew each other 
previously, perhaps from politics or other social events (Cicero, after all, belonged to a 
somewhat exclusive club of elites). In the dialogue, Scipio wanted to befriend Laelius for his 
good character, and Laelius wanted to befriend Scipio for his virtue.
170
 While this arrangement 
may have been ideal, Cicero was very much aware that amicitia could be created for personal 
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gain, as was his goal when befriending Pompey and Caesar to gain political support.
171
  It is 
agreed upon by historians that Cicero and Caesar maintained their amicitia for the trading of 
favors and help.  
Cicero discusses the role of politics in amicitia as well. The majority of his sentiments 
state that friends agree on almost everything, because a friend is a mirror of oneself. Yet 
disagreement in political matters did not preclude amicitia. In two letters, Cicero and Matius 
discuss their differences in political views, and how they do not allow their political differences 
to affect their amicitia.
172
 The first half of Cicero’s letter recalls their more personal amicitia 
since its beginning, with a great deal of emphasis on their enduring amicitia despite their 
political differences. Matius was a great friend of Caesar, and although it does not appear he was 
enthused by Caesar’s potential tyranny, Matius remained a loyal friend to both Caesar and 
Cicero and played an important role, based on his own good will (benevolentia) in reconciling 
them after the civil war. From these letters, it appears that Matius supported a proposed law 
(what the proposal entailed is unknown) and grieved at the death of Caesar, for which many 
people treated him unkindly. Cicero assures Matius that he still supports him politically because 
of their amicitia, and that Matius’s grief for a dead friend is a testament to his moral fiber. 
Though Matius was a staunch supporter of Caesar, Cicero remained loyal to Matius, showing, at 
least in this case, that politics affected amicitia only as much as Cicero would allow.  
The question becomes how much Cicero’s and Caesar’s politics affected their amicitia. It 
is clear that Cicero had more doubts about Caesar once he crossed the Rubicon in January of 49. 
That he needed to be reconciled with Caesar by Matius shows two points, the first being that they 
had to be reconciled, and the second that they were reconciled, at least superficially.  
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Furthermore, Caesar’s political ambitions were more far reaching and, in Cicero’s view, 
damaging than those of Matius.  It would be easy to overlook differences with just another 
Roman senator like Matius, but Caesar’s actions were difficult to ignore, and thus put a great 
strain on his public amicitia with Cicero.   
Though Cicero believed that true amicitiae were created by sincere reciprocity, he also 
acknowledged that once amicitia had been established, friends should help one another in any 
way possible, and that it was indeed expected for them to do so, but a mutual affection must be 
felt first: 
Atque haud sciam anne opus sit quidem nihil umquam omnino deesse amicis. Ubi enim 
studia nostra viguissent, si numquam consilio, numquam opera nostra nec domi nec 
militiae Scipio eguisset? Non igitur utilitatem amicitia, sed utilitas amicitiam secuta 
est.
173
 
 
And by no means should I know whether it is necessary, in fact, that anything at all ever 
be lacking between friends. Where indeed would my exertions have flourished if Scipio 
had never needed my advice, never needed my service, either at home or at war? 
Therefore it is not that amicitia comes from usefulness, but usefulness comes from 
amicitia.    
 
While friends must base their relationship on amor (love), Cicero believes that amicitia could not 
arise without one or both of the involved parties assisting the other in times of need. Friends 
should give small favors, such as advice or perhaps even loans, without the slightest 
apprehension. This is not to say that a friend should do whatever his comrade desires. Cicero 
strongly affirms that no one should ever ask a friend to do service that could be considered 
dishonorable or harmful either to oneself or to the patria (“fatherland”) such as instituting a 
tyranny nor should a friend, if asked, feel obligated to do a dishonorable service, especially one 
that does harm to the patria.
174
  Cicero is discussing what constitutes an ideal amicitia, but he 
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highlights a dishonorable service, which needs to be considered a problem in the abstract, but 
which also poses a very real problem for political amicitia on the mundane level.  As a practical 
matter, Cicero had to question anything and everything he did that could benefit Caesar and 
further Caesar’s personal political agenda.   
Amicitia was obviously important to Cicero, and the politics of late republican Rome 
demanded political amicitia and alliances. His speech de Provinciis consularibus (On the 
Provinces of the Proconsuls) offers singular insight into Cicero’s willingness to end or begin 
amicitiae for the benefit of the state. In this speech, in the late spring of 56, Cicero made a public 
declaration of his support for Caesar and the so-called “first” triumvirate as a whole. Cicero’s 
relationship with Caesar was rocky until this point, as only a few years previously Caesar had 
spoken out against the execution of Catiline and his conspirators.  Yet this speech is Cicero’s 
(successful) attempt to convince the Senate to allow Caesar to continue his conquest of Gaul. 
Both the political pressure from Pompey and Cicero’s realization that being on the good side of 
the triumvirs could benefit him led to this speech.  Whether this speech led directly to amicitia 
between Cicero and Caesar is unknown, but even if this speech were only given because Cicero 
felt that it was necessary to appease Caesar, the delivery (and subsequent publication) of the 
speech would have pleased Caesar regardless of the circumstance.  With Cicero cowed and 
Caesar pleased, a formal and public amicitia could begin.  Therefore, the oration cannot be 
written off as a mere result of political pressure because it had effects on their interactions.    
 Cicero puts his dislike for Caesar aside because he recognized that Caesar’s conquest of 
Gaul was best for Rome.
175
  The Gauls had repeatedly invaded Roman territory for centuries, 
with the most notable invasion culminating in the sack of Rome in 390 (or 387).  Since then, the 
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Gauls were a persistent fear and source of anxiety for Romans, and their pacification would at 
the very least ease this fear. Cicero says, “Ergo ego senator, inimicus, si ita vultis, homini, 
amicus esse, sicut semper fui, rei publicae debeo” (“Therefore I, as a senator, should be an 
enemy (inimicus) to the man [Caesar] if you like, but I should be a friend of the state, just as I 
always have been.”)176 Cicero uses the word inimicus (“not an amicus,” therefore a personal 
enemy) to show that personal issues must be put aside (an attitude that will be rectified 
eventually, if only superficially) because his duty to the state comes first. Later in the speech 
Cicero talks about forging a friendship with Caesar for the good of the state: “Quod volent 
denique homines existiment, nemini ego possum esse bene merenti de re publica non amicus” 
(“Finally let men suppose what they want, I can be an opponent to no one who does well for the 
republic.”)177 The use of “non amicus” here is significant. The difference in meaning between 
inimicus and non amicus is slight, but important. Inimicus usually is translated as “enemy”, while 
non amicus literally translates as “not a friend”. Cicero, then, is saying that he cannot not be a 
friend to someone who helps the state.  At the time, Caesar’s conquest of Gaul was seen as an 
effort to help guard Rome against the Gauls, hence Caesar was helping Rome.  This makes 
Caesar a (political) friend by default. Cicero is, therefore, required to be a friend. Even if 
Cicero’s sentiments were insincere, his assertions were made publicly with the purpose of 
showing the triumvirate that his public opposition was over; Caesar would have been pleased.   
Just as Cicero established amicitiae with those who benefited the state, so too did he end 
amicitiae with those who attempted to destroy Rome. When speaking of the Catilinarian 
conspirators in this same speech, he notes: 
Etenim, si iis, qui haec omnia flamma ac ferro delere voluerunt, non inimicitias 
solum, sed etiam bellum indixi atque intuli, cum partim mihi illorum familiares, 
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partim etiam me defendente capitis iudiciis essent liberati, cur eadem res publica, 
quae me in amicos inflammare potuit, inimicis placare non possit?
178
   
 
As a matter of fact, if I have proclaimed and brought not only personal enmities 
(inimicitias) but also war on those men who wanted to destroy everything by fire 
and sword, although of them are my friends (familiares), although some have 
been freed on capital charges even by defense, why should the same state, which 
was able to inflame me against friends (amicos), not be able to reconcile me with 
personal enemies (inimicis)? 
 
This passage, perhaps more so than any other, defines how Cicero viewed amicitia in the 
political sphere, and what he was willing to do both for and against friends. He was willing to 
hunt down and perhaps execute those friends of his who wished to see the destruction of Rome if 
they could not be reconciled to the state. Yet, as we have seen in the Caesarian speeches, Cicero 
still worked to appease Caesar and maintain an air of public amicitia, which implies that Cicero 
recognized that while Caesar’s tyrannical ambitions threatened the state, Caesar was also trying 
to end the chaos of the previous century, and for a brief moment Cicero could believe Caesar was 
trying to preserve the republic.
179
 This conflicted feeling makes their amicitia even more 
ambivalent, since Cicero was intelligent enough to see shades of gray between the black and 
white of republic and tyranny. 
De Amicitia may have been a piece of introspection that allowed Cicero a means to deal 
with his complicated feelings about amicitia, life, and politics in the aftermath of Caesar’s death. 
Many scholars now agree that Cicero’s philosophical writing was not just intended to transfer the 
wisdom of the Greeks to the Romans, but also was intended as a kind of therapeutic exercise for 
his own benefit.
180
 Yelena Baraz emphasizes that in addition to occupying his time, Cicero wrote 
many of his philosophical treatises for ameliorative purposes as a response to the death of his 
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daughter Tullia. She also observes, however, that some scholars have been too quick to attribute 
all of his philosophical writings to his grief for Tullia, and that Cicero expresses grief on other 
subjects as well, including the plight of the republic.
181
 There is sufficient evidence to suggest 
that de Amicitia was perhaps a means for Cicero to express, in a therapeutic manner, his 
reflections about the ongoing political upheaval in Rome. Cicero disapproved of the one-man 
rule that Caesar was attempting to establish, but perhaps his murder caused Cicero to question 
their previous amicitia.182  Thus, Cicero ruminated on what amicitia meant to him and to Roman 
society as a whole. In de Amicitia, Cicero does not mention any Greek writers, thereby 
suggesting that Cicero took this particular topic more personally than topics in other treatises.
183
    
While discussing amicitia and its function in the state, Cicero says that a tyrant cannot 
overthrow a state without friends, and that no man should give amicitia to someone who desires 
to overthrow the state for his own advantage.
184
 Further on he states that 
Haec enim est tyrannorum vita, nimirum in qua nulla fides, nulla caritas, nulla 
stabilis benevolentiae potest esse fiducia, omnia semper suspecta atque sollicita, 
nullus locus amicitiae.
185
 
 
So this is the life of tyrants, in which undoubtedly there can be no loyalty, no 
affection, no reliance on unwavering good will, everything is suspect and 
agitated. There is no place for amicitia.   
 
The tyrant is unable to have true friends, because his position rests within a world of duplicitous 
relationships and implicit distrust. The implications of that circumstance call into question how 
Caesar’s tyranny affected the former political amicitia of the two men. While their amicitia 
began to fail once Cicero supported Pompey in the civil war, Caesar seemed open enough to 
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Cicero after Pharsalus. One letter that Cicero wrote after Pharsalus shows his reaction at having 
Caesar (and his legions) visit his estate though he does not want it to happen again (as his 
sarcasm shows). Throughout Caesar’s coup d’etat, Cicero had conflicted feelings towards 
Caesar—he had sent laudatory letters about the general only months before, but now this same 
general was attempting to destroy the republic. Even if Cicero wanted to continue their amicitia, 
which is doubtful, he is convinced that it was politically impossible. 
For Cicero, true, personal amicitia was a rare occurrence and an almost sacred bond 
between two people. For most, amicitia was short-lived and not a true amicitia, since many were 
formed for political reasons focused on mutual giving and taking. But true friends, which Cicero 
believed were rare, were almost mirror images of one another. They often shared the same ideas, 
were fiercely loyal to one another, and more than anything were good righteous men. Though 
they may not always agree on politics or ways to resolve a problem, these differences can be 
overlooked for the joy that their amicitia brings. Friends complement one another. Where one 
might lack a certain attribute, the other might have a surplus of it, and thus the two men are 
better for it. All of these characteristics of true (personal) amicitia are the inverse of the amicitia 
between Caesar and Cicero. Scholars have recently paid more attention to de Amicitia, and a 
close analysis suggests that Cicero may have been attending to his own needs, perhaps licking 
his wounds and disentangling complicated emotions after the death of the tyrant Caesar.  In any 
case, the horrors of civil war and its violent consequences caused Cicero to rethink his attitude to 
political amicitia, which had been the foundation of his entire political career and of his attempts 
to regain his political standing after his return from Cilicia in 50 and after the republican loss at 
Pharsalus in 48.  
  
 
Conclusion 
 
 Cicero and Caesar were both prominent in the Roman republic, and their amicitia had the 
potential to shape history.  Because of this potential, it is important to understand the nature of 
the relationship between the two men.  The relationship, however you define it, was complicated.  
More complication arises because Caesar’s thoughts about it are generally lost.  Caesar’s letters 
were never compiled like Cicero’s, and his letters to Cicero have largely been lost.  Furthermore, 
any clues that Caesar may have given in his speeches have also been lost.  The characterization 
of their relationship then must come exclusively from Cicero’s perspective.  In contrast, a 
plethora of Cicero’s works survive, and many give conflicting messages regarding Caesar.   
 Scholars have long assumed that, because Cicero was a staunch supporter of the republic 
and republican ideals, and Caesar effectively ended the republic, the two were enemies.  Yet this 
explanation is simplistic and presupposes that Cicero knew what Caesar’s rule would bring.  
There is no direct evidence that Caesar planned to install a monarchy when he took power, and 
there is no evidence that Cicero knew for certain what Caesar intended.  This explanation also 
assumes that the two had no positive relationship before Caesar took power.  Life is not so black 
and white, and the two were colleagues in an elite political group that necessitated working with 
the opposition in order to succeed. Both were cunning politicians who recognized the necessity 
of compromise.  To say that Cicero simply wrote Caesar off is too crude.  Perhaps it is true that 
Cicero felt disdain for Caesar, but the two still had a working relationship that the Romans would 
define as amicitia.  
 Cicero’s letters offer as much clarification as they do distortion.  As we have seen, the 
letters in ad Quintem fratrem establish the beginning of their amicitia and show how it grew 
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between Caesar and Cicero.  Yet in spite of expressions of concern, there is a decidedly political 
and polite tone of formality in the letters.  Cicero was trying to curry favor with Caesar, and 
recognized that he would benefit from an amicitia with the general.  Yet there is no way to tell 
how sincere Cicero was in his praise and the expressions of his feelings for Caesar.  Cicero’s 
sincerity in his letters is a topic which must be researched further.  In Cicero’s letters to his 
friends and to Atticus, he reveals that, far from being on Pompey’s side of the civil war, he is 
conflicted regarding which faction to support.  It was not an easy decision for him, and it seems 
that he was never satisfied with that decision.  There is no doubt that Cicero wanted to see the 
republic restored, which begs the question of why he took so long to decide whom to support.  
After  the civil war  Cicero saw Caesar as the last hope for possibly restoring the republic.   
 Cicero’s Caesarian speeches help to show Cicero’s changing attitude in the period that 
they were delivered (early-mid 40s).  While Cicero may have exaggerated his praises in 
delivering pro Marcello, he offers Caesar advice on how to repair the republic and praises him 
for his clemency and the kindness that he has shown his enemies in the aftermath of the civil 
war.  He also is sure to critique Caesar about where he could improve, and he blames Caesar for 
the condition of Rome.  While he works with Caesar for pro Ligario, by the time that he is called 
upon to defend King Deiotarus, he is more ambivalent about the rule of Caesar.  At this time, 
Cicero’s letters start attacking Caesar again and it is clear that Cicero has given up hope about 
Caesar restoring the republic.  But this does not necessarily mean that he was elated about 
Caesar’s assassination.  While writing de Amicitia, he seems to reflect by omission on the nature 
of political amicitia, and though in this treatise he does not define what the two had as amicitia at 
all, nevertheless Roman society did define it as amicitia.  De Amicitia leaves the reader with the 
impression that, near the end of his career and of his own life, Cicero had serious second 
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thoughts about one major aspect of Roman political life.  
 How should scholars view the relationship between Cicero and Caesar? That question is 
just as complicated now as when I began this work.  I hope that I have proved that there were 
more significant nuances in the amicitia of Cicero and Caesar than is usually recognized.  The 
two men had a working amicitia of the political type for their own mutual benefit.  Both of these 
men needed one another in the public arena because of power, in the case of Caesar, and 
credibility, in the case of Cicero.  The two were not amici like Cicero and Atticus. They did not 
let their personal feelings intrude on the public utlity of the amicitia that they had fostered since 
Caesar’s time in Gaul, and had rebuilt after Caesar’s victory.  The two eventually had established 
a utilitarian political amicitia, and neither for a long time was willing to lose that relationship.      
   
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Appendix I: Amicitia and Modern Theories 
It is important to understand the causes, reasoning, and expectations associated with 
companionship and intimacy, all of which also bear on the meaning and functions of amicitia in 
any given context. Philosophy helps, but ultimately this form of investigation is introspective and 
subjective; modern social sciences offer the objective research that philosophy can never offer. 
Unfortunately, the ancients did not perform psychological and sociological studies to examine 
how and why amicitia emerged, existed, or ended. Historians today use social scientists’ 
understanding of “friendship” and interpersonal relationships.186 Caution is necessary. Ancient 
culture was very different from our own, so normative behavior in Rome may have been 
radically different from modern normative behavior. 
Let us look briefly at some common findings in modern psychological and sociological 
studies of friendship to provide some background and comparison for Cicero’s own 
philosophical ideas. Researchers have theorized four models for friendship: reinforcement, 
exchange and equity, cognitive consistency, and developmental theories.
187
 Reinforcement 
theory supposes that people are more likely to build friendships with those they feel give them 
rewards, and are more likely to connect with those that they have a positive association with. 
Exchange and equity theory is also associated with rewards, but focuses more on the results of 
the friendship. If everyone involved feels the friendship is producing positive results, then the 
friendship persists. Cognitive consistency theories suppose that humans expect balance in their 
relationships, and seek to balance the people around them with themselves and the objects in 
their world. Finally, developmental theories examine friendships in stages and the feelings 
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associated with these stages.  
These theories are far more complex than I can explain here, but the basic similarities 
show common themes between modern friendships and Roman amicitia.  One of the first 
commonalities is personal gain. Though Cicero states that amicitia comes first from personal 
warmth (more associated with developmental theory) he does say that mutual gain is important 
to amicitia and that amicitia could not exist without gain from one another. This gain is not 
always material however. Emotional gains and personal balance are all important.
188
 Only the 
developmental theories establish the reasoned justification for friendships changing as the 
relationship continues over time. All theories address personal fulfillment both emotionally and 
materially, topics that Cicero discusses and for the most part considers meaningful.  In the 
context of this thesis however, we must think of Cicero’s and Caesar’s public relationship as one 
of equity and exchange; Cicero and Caesar both invest in the relationship only to get positive 
outcomes for developments that they support.  Cicero was able to gain from Caesar some 
stability in his own political career, showing that the most powerful man in Rome supported him.  
For Caesar, amicitia with Cicero provided him the veneer of legitimacy in his rule, since 
Cicero’s high moral standards were beyond dispute at the time.  We can see then, that their 
amicitia was one of gain, and was not meant to provide the kind of fulfillment true personal 
amicitia provides.  Theirs was a political amicitia. 
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Appendix II: Timeline of de Amicitia 
The first significant datum is the very timing of the writing and publication of the work. 
Cicero is believed to have written de Amicitia in 44, because Cicero had not mentioned it in de 
Divinatione, also written in 44, when he recounted his philosophical works, but did so in de 
Officiis, which was finished by November of 44. Therefore de Amicitia ought to have appeared 
somewhere between the publication of the two works, that is, in the late summer or early autumn 
of the same year, the year of Caesar’s assassination.189 The prolific pace at which Cicero wrote 
his philosophical treatises is well known. Cicero published eleven philosophical works within a 
period of two years. Assuming that he wrote these treatises at an even pace, Cicero would have 
required approximately two months per treatise.  Cicero certainly had enough time to write de 
Amicitia between de Divinatione and de Officiis. The timing of the publication puts it in the 
middle of the political crisis after Caesar’s death.   
Cicero opens the work with the death of a friend. This seems an odd choice in that 
amicitia joins two people together and death separates them. In his opening, Cicero addresses 
Atticus several times, as if this were a private letter between the two. It is plain that Cicero 
dedicated the text to Atticus. Nonetheless, the critic must ask why Cicero chooses to begin with 
death in this way.  
It is interesting that in de Amicitia many of the traits and occurrences associated with 
Scipio reflect issues that affect other great men, including Caesar.  These include the acquisition 
of material wealth, fame, and the desire for immortality.  It is difficult to imagine a situation in 
which Caesar would, or even could, want more fame and money than he had already taken. He 
was enormously wealthy, a favorite of the plebs, a renowned general, and of course, at the end of 
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his life, the leader of the most powerful empire in the known world (with the arguable exception 
of Parthia). Cicero himself states in pro Marcello that Caesar had gained sufficient glory and 
notoriety, and that he was satisfied in his life.
190
  Caesar was certainly ambitious, but it is hard to 
imagine wanting more than what he possessed when he died, except power.  
It is also true that no one would have called Caesar niggardly; he is well known for being 
open handed with money, hosting lavish festivals as aedile, giving out massive loans to friends 
(such as Cicero), and the generosity he displayed in his will.
191
 Cicero also emphasizes the role 
of the people in the funeral of a beloved figure.
192
 Plutarch notes the crowds and fervor present 
during the funeral of Caesar, and describes their enthusiastic destruction of objects in the Forum 
to build Caesar’s pyre.193 Not only does Cicero speak of the funeral, but also the swiftness of 
Scipio’s death and the people’s perception of it.194 Caesar’s own ending was sudden. Cicero also 
mentions the suspicious circumstances around the death of Scipio, a fact that he could easily 
have ignored if he desired.
195
 Finally Scipio’s mortal egress is described as, “ut ex tam dignitatis 
gradu ad superos videatur deos potius quam ad inferos pervenisse” (“such that from a position of 
so much merit, he seems to have reached the gods on high rather than the gods of the 
underworld.”)196 This sentence feels strange. Scipio was not deified after his death, merely 
celebrated, but talk about Caesar being deified already may have begun in mid-44, and many 
Romans may have believed he really was a god.  
Cicero’s word choice and use of language also need to be explored in order to discuss 
underlying issues.  I am not suggesting that Scipio is a metaphor for Caesar, but that the issues 
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Cicero frames for Scipio may correspond in some way to questions surrounding Caesar and his 
assassination.  According to Suetonius, as Caesar’s first attackers approached and grabbed him, 
Caesar cried, “Ista quidem vis est!” (“Indeed this is violence!”)197 Does Laelius’s use of vis when 
his acolytes pressed him to speak more on amicitia, “Vim hoc quidem est afferre” (“Indeed this 
is to impart violence”) really echo Caesar’s declaration?198 Elsewhere Cicero also employs 
phrases and ideas he has uttered previously. When discussing the advantages of amicitia, Cicero 
states, “Verum etiam amicum qui intuetur, tamquam exemplar aliquod intuetur sui” ("he who 
looks upon a true friend, also looks upon him as a kind of example of himself.”)199 Years earlier 
during the Gallic campaigns in 54, Cicero, paraphrasing Aristotle, opens a letter to Caesar 
saying, “Vide quam mihi persuaserim te me esse alterum, non modo in is rebus quae ad me 
ipsum sed etiam in iis quae ad meos pertinent” (“See how I could persuade myself that you are 
another me, not merely in matters that pertain to me myself but even in those matters that pertain 
to my associates.”)200 His amicitia with Caesar had all but disintegrated by 44. It is certainly 
possible that Cicero forgot what he had written a decade earlier to Caesar, but at the very least, 
this letter shows that at one time Cicero considered Caesar a political amicus, and at the most, 
that he remembered his amicitia in this manner.  
Was Caesar a dead friend, a former friend, or no friend? Perhaps Cicero believed Caesar to 
be an example of what a friend was not. Cicero points to several reasons why amicitiae end, 
some of them natural such as a growing apart in regards to outlook on the world, or because of a 
geographic separation. But Cicero cites some interesting, specific reasons as to why some 
amicitiae end. Amicitia is often ruined by the struggle for office or power, and this is a primary 
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reason why childhood amicitia tends to fail: quests for political office and differences in political 
opinion.
201
 He adds that for most men the pursuit of money often ends amicitia, and so does “in 
optimis quibusque honoris certamen et gloriae” (“the struggle for honor and glory in all the best 
men.”)202  Questing for glory was essentially a career for Caesar and Cicero.  I layout these 
interpretative ideas here to show the importance of de Amicitia in Cicero’s re-thinking of the role 
of political amictia in the aftermath of Caesar’s assassination.     
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202
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